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I study the impact of different incentives on strategic decisions of parties that have the option 
of cooperating with each other. Incentive problems are well studied in various contexts, such 
as supply chain management and healthcare operations management. However, in the fast-
changing business environment, there is a need to study and understand the new and 
emerging strategic behaviors of firms to adopt better incentive mechanisms and reach desired 
outcomes. This dissertation consists of three essays that examine the strategic behavior of
parties under different incentive schemes.
In the first essay, I study the supply chain partnership of two potential competitors 
and evaluate the impact of limited capacity on their strategic behavior. An increasing number 
of original brand manufacturers (OBMs) do not have in-house production capability, and 
thus rely on competitive contract manufacturers (CCMs) on the supply side. This increasing 
demand puts CCMs in a capacity allocation dilemma between their own product and the 
two potential competitors to 
cooperate and compete (coopetition), compete, or only cooperate (supply chain partnership). 
I show that the OBM might multi-source its component demand only when competition in 
the final-product market is intense. Moreover, the CCM can be worse off from having more 
The second and third essays are inspired by changes in healthcare funding models 
that reward quality care. In the second essay, I examine performance-based payment 
contracts to promote the optimal use of an optional diagnostic test that will help determine if 
a cancer patient would benefit from an advanced treatment option. This essay is inspired by 
three ongoing trends: tremendous increases in the cost of new advanced cancer drugs, 
development of new diagnostic tests to allow physicians to tailor treatments to patients, and 
changes in healthcare funding models that reward quality care. I model the interaction 
between two parties a healthcare payer and an oncologist where the oncologist has 
not know whether the optimal course of action is used by the oncologist (moral hazard). I 
demonstrate that, in the presence of information asymmetry, an oncologist should never test 
all patients, even when the diagnostic test is available for free. I also show that it is not 
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always socially optimal to make a diagnostic test compulsory, even if such a policy can be 
implemented for free.
In the third essay, I study gain-sharing agreements between a hospital and a 
healthcare provider that can only treat a patient and achieve the desired quality of care with 
collective effort. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) introduced a 
bundled payment model for lower extremity joint replacement (LEJR) that offers hospitals a 
-acute care. 
This bundled payment model aims to incentivize hospitals to enter into agreements with 
providers to ensure that the total treatment cost and care quality meets the bundled payment 
requirements. However, I show that the bundled payment does not always incentivize a 
hospital to offer gain-sharing agreements to the provider. Furthermore, I show that the 
provider prefers a low bundled payment, such that the hospital needs the provider to reduce 
the total cost of treatment.
Keywords
Strategic Supply Chain Management, Game Theory, Incentive alignment, Contract Design, 
Operations Research, Management Science, Health Economics
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1Chapter 1
1
Recent technological advances have led to a substantial increase in the sophistication of 
products and services. Companies now have more customized and targeted products and 
services than ever before. As a result, it has become impossible for organizations to 
contain all procedures and production in-house. Instead, firms are becoming more 
specialized and focused, which has led to decentralized and fragmented supply chains. 
For example, outsourcing the production of components of a product is a very common 
practice among original brand manufacturers (OBMs) because doing so (instead of
investing in production facilities) allows firms to invest in product development instead, 
which may provide greater competitive advantage. New Venture Research (NVR) 
estimates that the contract manufacturing industry will grow from $430 billion in 2015 to
$580 billion in 2020 (NVR, 2016).
Similarly, in the healthcare industry, the growing number of treatment options and
availability of personalized medicine have dramatically increased the cost of treatment 
and the number of care providers. For instance, the 21-gene assay for breast cancer 
(Oncotype Dx), introduced by Genomic Health Inc. in 2004, is a gene-expression 
profiling test that can help guide cancer treatment decisions. Likewise, there are many 
independent care providers that specialize in a specific procedure required in treating a 
. However, in a fragmented healthcare system enforcing standard 
protocols to ensure that physicians follow through with appropriate patient care is a 
barrier to adopting these new technologies (Davis et al., 2010). Therefore, as Kaplan and
Porter (2012) describe, one of the challenges in terms of healthcare cost crises is the 
complex path of care due to the highly fragmented way in which healthcare is delivered.
It is well known that, decentralization creates inefficiency in supply chains. This 
inefficiency is caused by a lack of coordination among the different stages of a supply 
chain, and the lack of coordination among parties stems from two causes: (1) conflict 
between the respective interests and objectives of the parties, and (2) the distortion of 
2information as it moves between the stages of the supply chain. The purpose of this thesis 
decisions under different incentive mechanisms. The results generated from this thesis 
add to the current knowledge on the effects of decentralization on supply chains. 
Moreover, I provide managerial insights for firms in both the manufacturing and 
healthcare industries on how to coordinate their supply chains using some incentive 
mechanisms. Supply chain partnership and coordination provide firms with higher 
revenues and opportunities to access more financial resources for future business 
investments. I illustrate how the new advancements in healthcare services require 
alternative payment mechanisms to achieve a higher quality of care and lower treatment 
costs. Finally, this thesis highlights the importance of customizing coordinating 
mechanisms to the specific system settings by showing the sensitivity of the coordination 
and strategic decisions of firms to these incentive mechanisms.
1.1
In Chapter 2, I study the supply chain partnership of two potential competitors an OBM 
and a competitive contract manufacturer (CCM) and evaluate the impact of limited 
capacity on their strategic behavior. It is common for firms in different stages of a 
decentralized supply chain to compete with each other in the final product market. There 
are many studies that examine the scenario of competition between supply chain partners
(e.g., Venkatesh et al., 2006; Xu et al., 2010; Wang et al., 2013; Yang et al., 2014). These 
studies either analyze the partnership of competitors for the supply of a proprietary 
component, or do not incorporate the limited capacity on the supply side of the shared 
component. 
In Chapter 2, I extend the literature to a more realistic setting, where there is 
competition in the component market and the CCM faces a resource allocation problem 
due to limited capacity when choosing a partnership strategy with its competitor. I derive 
the conditions that incentivize the two potential competitors to cooperate and compete 
(coopetition), compete, or only cooperate (supply chain partnership). In particular, I show 
how firms can optimally use supply chain partnership and resource allocation to 
overcome the operational and pricing obstacles in a decentralized supply chain. I show 
3that the OBM might multi-source its component demand only when competition in the
final-product market is intense.
might decrease while retail price might increase. Moreover, even when capacity is 
available for free, the CCM can be worse off from having more capacity. Further, the
competing products become more substitutable.
In Chapter 3, I study the incentive problem of a healthcare purchaser (payer) and 
a healthcare provider (provider) for using a diagnostic test; to do so, I investigate
performance-based payment contracts to align the incentives of two parties to achieve 
optimal use of optional diagnostic tests. There are studies in healthcare operations 
regarding use of diagnostic tests in various 
healthcare settings (e.g., Yaesoubi and Roberts, 2011; Dai et al., 2015; Dai et al., 2016). I
extend this literature by studying payment mechanisms that coordinates the incentives of 
a healthcare payer and a provider, in the presence of information asymmetry, while 
-making 
process. I show that the advent of new diagnostic tests necessitates new reimbursement 
models because current payment models do not account for treatment choices of the
provider, and thus cannot coordinate a decentralized healthcare setting. I also highlight 
the importance of information flow in the healthcare system by showing that when there 
is imperfect information flow between the payer and the provider, the payer should 
motivate the provider to only test certain types of patients, even if the diagnostic test can 
be available for free. Furthermore, I find that an increase in reputational concerns and 
altruistic behavior of a provider may increase social welfare. Finally, I show that it is not 
always socially optimal to make a diagnostic test compulsory, even if there is no cost to 
implement such a policy.
In Chapter 4, I study gain-sharing agreements between a hospital and a provider 
that can only treat a patient and achieve the desired quality of care collectively. There are 
some studies that evaluate gain-sharing agreements in healthcare operations management, 
especially in the pharmaceutical industry (Barros, 2011; Zhang et al., 2011; Mahjoub et 
al., 2013). These studies analyze the coordination of a pharmaceutical company with a 
4There are also papers that investigate bundled payment models in different healthcare 
settings (Andritsos and Tang, 2015; Adida et al., 2016; Guo et al., 2016). I extend the 
literature by studying the impact of gain-sharing agreements in a healthcare setting with a 
bundled payment that ties the profit of the hospital and the provider. This study is 
motivated by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) lower extremity 
joint replacement (LEJR) bundled payment. This bundled payment model aims to 
incentivize hospitals to enter into agreements with providers to coordinate care and to 
ensure that the total treatment cost and care quality meets the bundled payment 
requirements. I illustrate that a target price bundled payment model would be more 
effective in healthcare settings where there is more asymmetry between the hospital and 
-reduction efficiency. I also show that while using a gain-sharing 
agreement might be a win-win-win scenario for the payer, the hospital, and the provider, 
good design of the target price bundled payment is essential to incentivize a hospital to 
offer gain-sharing agreements to the provider. In addition, the provider prefers a low 
bundled payment such that the hospital needs the provider to reduce the total cost of 
treatment.
In the final chapter, I present an overview of the main results and the managerial 
insights from the analysis of the fragmented supply chain settings discussed in the thesis.
I further highlight the policy implications of the implementation of the results.
51.2
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7Chapter 2
2
Outsourcing the production of selected components to competitors is becoming more 
attention to outsourcing and the growing demand in many markets can result in capacity 
allocation conflicts for the contract manufacturers. In this study, I consider a scenario in 
which the OBM decides whether to outsource to a third-party supplier or to a competitive 
contract manufacturer (CCM) who has the option of producing a competing product and 
also has limited capacity. The CCM first chooses the wholesale price and decides 
whether or not to sell a competing product to the customers. Next, the OBM decides the 
proportion of its component demand to outsource to the CCM, and then firms set the 
retail prices. I show that the OBM might multi-source its component demand only when 
competition in the final-product market is intense. I
increases, demand may decrease while the retail price may increase. Moreover, the CCM 
can be worse off from havin
free. The results also show that demand may increase when competition in the final-
product market becomes more intense. Finally, I find that the value of having a third-
party supplier to produce the component decreases amid the intensity of competition in 
the final-product market.
2.1
TPV Technology (TPV), the largest electronic manufacturer of computer monitors, sells 
monitors under its own brands AOC and Envision in the final-product market and 
acts as a supplier to Philips, which sells monitors under the Philips brand. This 
overall demand for monitors is beyond the capacity of TPV, and thus, TPV has decided
to reduce the production of its own brands in order to satisfy the outsourcing orders it 
receives from Philips (Wang, 2008).
8Outsourcing the production of certain components to competitive contract 
manufacturers (CCMs) like TPV is becoming more common among original brand 
manufacturers (OBMs); however, growing demand often results in capacity-allocation 
conflicts for these CCMs. For example, Apple outsources its NAND Flash memory 
requirement to Samsung (Kim, 2012), but as smartphones become more popular, 
Samsung finds it increasingly difficult to fulfill the demand. Such capacity-allocation 
mple, 
Franz Inc. (Franz) is a contract manufacturer that produces home décor accessories (e.g., 
tableware, vases and jewellery) for OBMs like Enesco and Lenox. In 2002, Franz started 
to sell products under its own brand while continuing to supply for the OBMs. The 
company reached its capacity limit due to increasing orders from OBMs, and eventually, 
in 2005, Franz decided to prioritize the production of its own brand products ahead of 
others (Yan, 2013). Tesla Motors was the supplier of battery packs for Mercedes B-class 
Electric Drive. Despite strong demand for its own automobile, the Tesla Model S, Tesla 
Motors could not increase the production amount due to its limited supply of batteries 
(Herron, 2013).
These examples show that when the CCM has a limited capacity, the OBM can 
-
capacity, thereby mitigating competition in the final-product market. On the other hand, 
precisely because of this reason, the CCM sets a higher wholesale price, and thus, the 
introduction of a capacity constraint adds some interesting trade-offs for the firms. As 
both cooperation between competitors and capacity shortages begin to occur with 
increasing frequency, studies of the interaction between these phenomena and the 
resulting impacts become more relevant.
In this study, I
limited capacity. In particular, the OBM does not produce a critical component of its 
product in-house (e.g., the comp
9the component to be outsourced to the CCM while the remaining production can be 
outsourced to a third-party supplier. The CCM has limited capacity in the production of 
the critical component, so it must decide whether or not to sell products to customers 
under its own brand. Moreover, the CCM must decide the wholesale price of the 
component in order to compete with other third-party suppliers. 
This study considers the following research questions:
1.
ility?
2. How do the competition in the final-product market (between the OBM and 
the CCM) and the competition in the component market (between the CCM 
and the third-
profitability?
In response to these questions, I present several interesting findings. First, despite 
the fact that CCM has the option of not selling final products to customers, but rather 
I find that the firms may forgo this 
opportunity. In particular, regardless of the capacity limit, the CCM always sells in the 
final-product market when the competition between the OBM and the CCM in low. 
However, when the competition in the final-product market is very intense, the CCM 
might hold a monopoly in the component market, while the OBM holds a monopoly in 
the final-product market. In order to be the monopoly in the final-product market, the 
the rest of its component demand from the cheaper third-party suppliers. I also show that 
the OBM only multi-source its component when the CCM does not sell in the final-
product market.
Second, when capacity increases, one might expect that demand would increase 
while retail price would decrease. Surprisingly, I find that this intuition does not hold true 
when there is a shift in outsourcing strategy. Moreover, even when capacity is available 
ofit
10
are competitors. Third, my
increase when the competing products become more substitutable. Furthermore, even 
though the CCM has less incentive to allocate its capacity to produce components for the 
OBM when the intensity of competition in the final-product market increases, the value 
of having a third-party supplier to produce the component decreases as competition 
intensifies. 
This chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, I review the related 
literature. I then present the mathematical model and the analytical results in Sections 2.3
and 2.4. In Section 2.5, I analyze the value of competition in the component market 
through a comparison of the basic model using a benchmark model without the third-
party supplier. In Section 2.6, I consider a scenario where OBM can order excess quantity 
(buy-and- -product market. Finally, I provide 
concluding remarks and managerial insights. I present the details of the derivation of the 
equilibriums and the proofs of the results in Appendix-A.
2.2
My study relates to two areas of research. The first stream of literature examines the 
scenario of competition between supply-chain partners. Venkatesh et al. (2006) and Xu et 
al. (2010) study the optimal strategies of a manufacturer who owns the proprietary 
component brand. The manufacturer decides whether to use the components exclusively, 
whether to become a supplier of an OBM, or whether to become a hybrid of both. These 
two studies show that the proprietary component manufacturer should hold a monopoly 
in the final-product market only when the two products are almost perfect substitutes. In
my study, the component is not of a proprietary nature, so the manufacturer cannot hold a 
monopoly in the final-product market. 
Wang et al. (2013) examine the advantage of being the first mover when the 
component is not of a pr
wholesale price should be smaller than the third-
However, I show that in a setting with capacity, the OBM would be willing to pay a 
higher wholesale price in order to reduce competition in the final-product market. Pun 
11
(2014) studies how an OBM should outsource its non-proprietary components when 
firms can exert effort to improve their production process. This author finds that the 
OBM might be better off outsourcing both the production and the process-improvement 
effort to the competitor, even when the competitor has a higher cost. Pun (2015) 
considers the optimal degree of cooperation between two competing manufacturers when 
the components are not proprietary and finds that competitors can be worse off from 
more cooperation, even when these competitors have better production capabilities. The 
studies discussed in this stream of literature do not consider capacity constraints, so I
extend this literature by considering suppliers that have limited capacity.
This study examines the ways that capacity constraint affects firms. Osborne and 
Pitchik (1986) characterize the Nash equilibria in a duopoly that has limited capacity, 
showing that limited capacity could be beneficial because capacity constraint can be used 
to mitigate competition. Gupta and Wang (2007) study the capacity-allocation problem of 
a contract manufacturer that can accept two types of orders: high-volume contractual 
orders and one-time transactional orders. They find that the threshold acceptance policy 
is optimal, and a contract manufacturer can be better off serving only transactional orders 
when capacity is tight. Ülkü et al. (2007) consider the capacity constraint of a contract 
manufacturer and consider how the risk should be distributed to different OBMs when 
-to-stock
and make-to-order mechanisms for a supplier, seeking the point at which the fixed-
capacity allocation level between two different orders becomes optimal. Martínez-de-
Albéniz and Talluri (2011) study dynamic price competition under uncertain demand. 
They provide a characterization of the equilibrium and show that firms may price their 
product at the reservation value of their competitor. The studies discussed in this 
paragraph assume that the firms are either supply-chain partners or competitors, and I
extend this stream of literature by considering the case where competitors are also 
supply-chain partners.
Yang et al. (2014) consider the distribution strategies of a manufacturer of 
proprietary component brands with limited capacity when the OBM and its supplier are 
competitors in the final-product market. These authors find that the OBM may order 
12
excess inventory, and all firms and their customers can be better off from a system with 
limited capacity. In my study, I consider the case where the component is of a commodity 
nature, such that there is more than one supplier for the component. Therefore, I consider 
competition in the component market, and this competition provides an upper limit to the 
wholesale price that the OBM is willing to accept.
To the best of my knowledge, I am the first to examine how capacity affects the 
supply-chain structure in an oligopolistic competition when one firm might outsource a 
commodity component to its competitor.
2.3
I consider a scenario where an OBM (firm O) must outsource the production of a critical 
component. The component can be a monitor for the TPV example, a NAND Flash 
memory for the Samsung example, or a battery pack in Tesla example. For simplicity, I
follow the literature on the supply-chain relationship between competitors (e.g., 
Venkatesh et al., 2006; Xu et al., 2010; Wang et al., 2013; Pun, 2014; Pun, 2015) by 
assuming that the final product consists of this component only. 
There are two potential suppliers of this component. The first is a CCM (firm C) 
that also has a competing product. The production cost is normalized to zero, and firm C 
sells components to firm O at a wholesale price .
capacity of the component is .1 Similar to Gupta and Wang (2007), I assume that firm C 
produces everything in-house and does not outsource to other third-party suppliers when 
facing capacity shortage.
The second component supplier is a third-party supplier (firm T) that does not 
have the option of producing a competitive product under its own brand. Firm T can also 
                                                
1 Since there are many industry examples where a firm reveals its production capacity, I assume that firm 
I note that Samsung and TPV Technologies 
present their capacity information on public websites (www.icinsights.com/news/bulletins/Samsung-
TSMC-And-Micron-Top-List-Of-IC-Industry-Capacity-Leaders/ and www.tpv-
tech.com/attachment/201504131218064_en. pdf).
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be interpreted as the spot market, where the component can be purchased off the shelf. 
Similar to other related literature on contract manufacturing (e.g., Jeannet, 2009; Wang et 
al., 2013), I assume that there are many identical and independent third-party suppliers 
is in line with many industry practices. As an example, even though Samsung holds a 
30% market share in the NAND Flash memory market, there are many other non-
competitive suppliers (e.g., Toshiba, SanDisk and Intel) from which Apple can outsource 
this critical component (DRAMeXchange, 2014). I incorporate the asymmetry between 
the component manufacturers by assuming firm C can be more cost-efficient than firm T 
(Arya et al., 2008; Pun, 2015). Thus, unlike firm C, the production cost of firm T is 
assumed to be non-negative. Due to the intense competition among these suppliers, firm 
is exogenously determined as the equilibrium market price in 
a competitive market which is simply the production cost (i.e., perfect competition). Note 
that, when the two component suppliers are symmetric. The reason that, unlike 
O might 
accept a higher wholesale price for the component of firm C (compared to the price 
offered by other non-competitive suppliers) only because buying from firm C can reduce 
-product market. Moreover, since firm O can outsource to any 
of these non-competitive suppliers whenever one of them meets capacity, I do not 
consider a capacity limit for firm T.
Firm O decides the proportion of its component demand to be allocated to firm C 
( ), and the remaining component demand ( ) will be allocated to firm T. 
There are three outsourcing strategies for firm O: (1) Firm O does not outsource to firm C 
(i.e., ), so firms O and C are pure competitor; (2) Firm O single-sources to firm C 
(i.e., ), and (3) firm O multi-sources to firms C and T (i.e., ). The two 
firms are supply-chain partners and competitors when if firm C also sells products 
under its own brand.
The customers are assumed to have a unit reservation price for a product, and the 
products of firms O and C are located at an exogenously specified distance apart. 
When is small, the two products are more substitutable, and hence competition 
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becomes intense. The length of the Hotelling line is sufficiently larger than such that 
all customers located between the two firms would buy, but not all customers located 
outside the two firms would buy. Each customer incurs a disutility per unit distance and 
will buy whichever product provides the higher positive utility. Despite the fact that all 
the results can be driven for more general form, for expositional convenience, I assume 
that the disutility per unit distance is equal to 1. Therefore, the total demand depends on 
the distance between two products. Customers would have zero utility when not 
making a purchase. Thus, when buying a product from firm at retail price , a 
customer that is away from firm would have utility: 
(2.1)
Figure 2.1:
( ) can be derived from the
al., 2006; Xu et al., 2010). Figure 2.1
utilities and the demands; the triangles illust
products (customers at zero distance will have a utility of ). For each product, I
find the location of the customer who is indifferent between buying a product or not 
(customer with zero utility located in the far-left or far-right of the Hotelling line). Then I
find the location of the customer located between the two products who is indifferent 
between buying either product. The total demand of a product would be the sum of the 
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distances of the indifferent customers located outside and inside the two firms on the 
Hotelling line. Consequently, the profit function of firm O is as follows:
(2.2)
The two parts of 
under its own brand, the profit and the capacity constraint are
(2.3)
(2.4)
When firm C does not sell products under its own brand, the profit and the capacity 
constraint of firm C are
(2.5)
(2.6)
As commonly used in the related literature (e.g., Cui et al., 2008; Wang et al., 
2013) and consistent with many industry practices (e.g., Foxconn, Asustek), I assume that 
firm C first sets the wholesale price and then firm O decides the proportion of its 
component demand to be outsourced to each supplier, given the wholesale prices. 
Therefore, I consider two levels of competition: competition in the component market 
between firms C and T, and competition in the final-product market between firms O and 
C. The game sequence is as follows.
1) Firm C decides and chooses whether or not to sell its own product.
2) Firm O decides .
3) Firm O decides . If applicable, firm C decides .
I use backward induction to find the equilibrium solutions.
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2.4
The competition in the final-product market, that is captured through product 
substitutability I will show 
in Propositions 2.1 and 2.4 that firm O always single sources when the degree of 
competition is low ( ) and might multi-source when competition is intense (
).  This is because firm C cannot set an arbitrary high wholesale price due to the 
competition with firm T in the component market.  Moreover, when the competition 
between firms O and C in the final-product market is small, firm O is not willing to pay a 
high wholesale price to buy-out firm C's capacity.
For clarity of expositions, I first focus the analysis to the case when the product 
competition is low ( ). Specifically, I present the equilibrium strategy in 
Proposition 2.1. I
and profit in Proposition 2.
demand in Proposition 2.3. Lastly, I expand the analysis to the case when the final 
product competition is very intense ( ) in Proposition 2.4.
In order to derive the equilibrium solution, I use the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker 
t. I separate the optimization problem 
into two cases: 1) binding capacity equilibrium, where firm C uses all of its capacity; and 
2) non-binding capacity equilibrium, where firm C has some unused capacity. 
Consequently, starting from the last stage of the game, I derive two different sets of 
optimal pricing strategies for the firms, depending on the capacity constraint (i.e., 
binding/non-binding). In the second stage of the game, firm O decides the proportion of 
its component demand to be allocated to firm C (
wholesale price ( and and product 
substitutability . Finally, in the first stage of the game, firm C chooses its wholesale 
price, anticipating the outsourcing strategy of firm O. 
In the equilibrium solution, firm C maximizes its profit function by choosing the 
wholesale price 
ility and participation constraints. 
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The incentive compatibility constraint ensures that firm O would not deviate to other 
firm O gets at least as much as its outside option when it outsources to firm T. Finally, 
knowing the best outcome of each strategy, firm C chooses the equilibrium strategy with 
its wholesale price, depending on capacity and product 
substitutability . Details of the derivation of the equilibrium are presented in Appendix-
A.
First, I present the results for the case when the product competition is low, and 
then I show the effect of high product competition on the equilibrium solution. 
Lemma 2.1: Define . When the 
competition in the final-product market is low (i.e., ) firm C always sells in the 
final-product market.
Lemma 2.1 shows that firm C always sells in the final-product market when the 
competition in the final-product market is low. This is because when competition 
between the two products is intense, firm O would have more benefit if firm C does not 
sell product to the customers. However, when the degree of competition is not high, there 
-product market 
-product 
market because of low profits in the component market resulted from lower acceptable 
wholesale prices by firm O.
Proposition 2.1 and Figure 2.2 present the optimal strategies of the two firms 
when . I define four regions: firm O outsources to firm T in Regions I and II, and 
constraint is binding in Regions I and III, and firm C has excess capacity in Regions II 
and IV. I also define capacity thresholds and  (i.e., ) to 
describe the locations of the strategy changes in the equilibrium solution. For example, 
is located at the boundary of Regions II and III. I denote the optimal solution with 
superscrip , and is the 
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maximum acceptable wholesale price by firm O such that it is better off to outsource to 
firm C if and only if . See Appendix-A for analytical expressions.
Proposition 2.1: When , the optimal strategy is such that firm C sells products to 
customers and
1) If , firm O outsources to firm T and .
2) If , firm O outsources to firm C and .
The capacity constraint is binding if and only if or .
When firm C has plenty of capacity (Region IV), it has sufficient capacity to 
produce for both firms. The literature that studies supply-chain partnerships with a 
competitor focuses on this region (e.g., Venkatesh et al., 2006; Xu et al., 2010; Wang et 
al., 2013). However, I show that even in Region IV firm O might accept a wholesale 
price from firm C that is higher than that of firm T (i.e., ). This is because firm 
O would be better off when cooperating with its competitor compared to the case where it 
outsources to firm T. 
Figure 2.2: Optimal outsourcing strategies when 
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iate at Region III. When firm O outsources to firm 
-product 
market can be mitigated. Therefore, firm O would outsource to firm C, and firm C would 
set a non-negative wholesale price that is higher than what is offered by firm T (i.e., 
. The outsourcing strategy in this region could explain how Philips 
caused TPV to reduce its own brand output by outsourcing the production of its monitors 
to TPV. 
I show in Lemma A1 (in Appendix-A) that weakly decreases in the capacity 
of firm C. Therefore, one might expect that when firm C has a low capacity (Regions I 
and II, where firm C can charge a high wholesale price to firm O), instead of using the 
capacity to produce for its own product, firm C is better off using all capacity to supply to 
firm O so that firms O and C can hold monopolies in the final-product market and in the 
component markets, respectively. Interestingly, I find that firm O would not outsource to 
firm C in these two regions. This is because, on the one hand, firm C can sell its product 
to the customers at a high retail price, and hence, it would require a high wholesale price 
product. On the other hand, competition between suppliers C and T provides a limit in 
terms of how high a wholesale price firm O is willing to accept. I find that the wholesale 
product is higher than the wholesale price that firm O is willing to accept (i.e., 
). Therefore, both firms would forgo the opportunity of holding monopolies in the 
component market and in the final-product market, and both would prefer to act as pure 
competitors. Moreover, when firm C sells a final product to customers when it has small 
capacity, it will price its products high, which in turn will allow firm O to price its 
product higher than its price in the monopoly market. Gelman and Salop (1983) showed 
similar results, where they found that when the two firms are not supply chain partners
and the new entrant had limited capacity, it was not profitable for the incumbent to hold a 
monopoly in the market. I ors are 
supply chain partners.
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At Region II, firm O does not outsource to firm C, even though firm C has some 
capacity to produce its own products, but the gain from component sales to firm O would 
not compensate for the loss from the reduction in final product sales. Therefore, firm C 
would set a high wholesale price (i.e., ) to discourage firm O from outsourcing 
to firm C. This result can explain the market choices of some competitive CMs like 
Franz, who prioritize capacity to their own brands and turn down outsourcing contracts 
when facing capacity-allocation conflicts (Yan, 2013).
Proposition 2.2 presents the impact of capacity to demand, price and profit for the 
case where . Figure 2.3 illustrates the impact of capacity on demands and prices 
(Propositions 2.2a and 2.2b) and Figure 2.4 illustrates the impact of capacity on profit 
(Proposition 2.2c).
Proposition 2.2: Define , , and
, where is a small positive number. When  ,
a.
and .
b. Firm i's price may increase in capacity: .
c.
or
for all 
When 
while demands would increase. I find that this intuition does not hold when the capacity 
of firm C is around . This is because, as increases, the strategy changes from the 
two firms acting as pure competitors (Region I or Region II) to acting as coopetitors 
(Region III). Therefore, firm C would shift some of its capacity to produce components 
for firm O, and thus, its demand decreases and price increases. Venkatesh et al. 
(2006) in Proposition 3 of their paper find that firms would set higher prices under 
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coopetition relationships. I extend this finding to a system with limited capacity by 
showing that firm C sets a higher price because, in addition to the two firms acting as 
coopetitors, firm C uses some of the capacity to produce for firm O and thus produces 
fewer units for itself. Firm O also sets a higher retail price because it shifts from using 
a cheaper supplier (firm T) to using a more expensive supplier (firm C), so it sets a higher 
retail price in order to maintain the margin.
Figure 2.3: and price as a function of 
When firm O outsources to firm C and firm C has sufficient capacity to produce 
for both firms (Region IV), or when firm O outsources to firm T and firm C has sufficient 
capacity to produce for itself (Region II), the ts are not affected by the 
capacity level (cf. Figure 2.4). However, when capacity is binding, firm C may be worse 
off from having more capacity, even when that capacity can be available for free. This is 
because, in Regions I and III, the retail prices of both firms would decrease when firm C 
has more capacity, so competition becomes more intense. I find that the impact of a 
decrease in retail prices is larger than the impact of an increase in demand, so the profit of 
firm C decreases. In other words, selling the extra output requires firm C to lower its 
market price which results in lower overall profit. This can be interpreted as the cost of 
know
when its capacity increases, firm C cannot prevent the increasing competition by limiting 
its output (by hiding its extra capacity from firm O) and thus keeping its market price 
high. Osborne and Pitchik (1985) also find that having a limited capacity could be 
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beneficial for the small firm as the reduction in competition due to smaller capacity may 
offset the lower output levels of the small firm.
Furthermore, the second part of Proposition 2.2c shows that the impact of profit-
decreases-in-capacity (Region III) is larger when firms O and C cooperate as supply-
chain partners than when firms act as competitors only (Region I). This is because firms 
would set higher prices under the coopetition scenario than under the competition 
scenario. When capacity increases, the decrease in price under the coopetition scenario is 
larger than that under the competition scenario, so the decrease in profit is larger. This 
finding illustrates the 
competitors cooperate as supply-chain partners. One key takeaway is that firms are not 
always better off with more capacity, especially when they are coopetitors.
Figure 2.4:
The two products are more substitutable when they are located closer to one 
another ( decreases), leading to a more intense competition. Then Proposition 2.3
presents the impact of the degree of competition to the demand of firm C when .
Proposition 2.3: When , f
competition in the final-product market: (entire Region III).
23
As expected, demand of a product decreases when competition intensify (in 
Regions I, II and IV). However, Proposition 2.3 shows that when the two firms are 
supply-chain partners and when firm C has no excess capacity (Region III), the demand 
for a product increases, even when the two products become more substitutable (
decreases). This is because decreases. Therefore, 
when capacity level is tight, firm C would
product. Firm C would have more capacity to produce product under its own brand, so it 
would set a lower price for its product, in turn leading to a higher demand .
In the results presented above, I assume that competition in the final-product 
market is low (i.e., ). In this case, firm O would never multi-source to both 
suppliers (i.e., is never optimal). This is because firm O will outsource as 
many components as possible to firm C if the wholesale price is less than . Therefore, 
the only possible scenario that might lead to a multi-sourcing 
the wholesale price such that 
firm O is better off to outsource to firm C. However, in Proposition 2.1 I show that firm 
C always sells in final-product market even when its capacity is low, so firm C would set 
a high wholesale price to deter firm O from buying out its capacity. Thus, firm O would 
never multi-source.
Next, I will illustrate in Proposition 2.4 that firm O may multi-source when the 
competition between the two products is very intense ( ). I present the optimal 
strategy in Figure 2.5, and the analytical definition of the six regions are presented in 
Appendix-A. I define two new regions for the case where the competition is very intense: 
firm O multi-sources from firm C and firm T in Region V, and firm O outsources to firm 
C in Region VI.  Moreover, in both Regions V and VI firm O holds a monopoly in the 
final-product market.
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Figure 2.5: Optimal outsourcing strategies when 
Proposition 2.4: When competition between the two products is very intense ( ),
a. Firm C does not sell in the final-product market in Regions V and VI.
b. Firm O multi-sources in Region V. 
Recall from Proposition 2.1 that when the competition between the two final 
products is low ( ), firm C would always sell to customers in the final-product 
market. However, when the two products are very substitutable ( ), Proposition 
2.4a shows that firm C might be better off serving plier and opting not to
sell in the final-product market (cf. Regions V and VI in Figure 2.5). There are two 
different reasons behind this strategy.
First, intuitively when firm T n
cost), firm C can set higher wholesale prices compared to the cases where firm T has low 
wholesale price. Then, coupled with the fact that firm C cannot set a high retail price 
because of the strong degree of substitutability between the two products, firm C can earn 
more profit from selling components to firm O than from selling products in the final-
product market. In these scenarios (Region VI), firm O holds the monopoly in the final-
product market, and firm C holds the monopoly in the component market. In this case 
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final-product market to avoid high competition and lower retail prices. This is because 
when the competition in the final-product market is very intense firm O can increase its 
retail price significantly if firm C does not sell in the final-product market compared to 
the case where firms compete in the final-product market. 
Proposition 2.4b shows that when competition among final products is very 
intense there is a region (Region V) where firm O multi-sources its component from 
firms C and T. The reason for multi-sourcing is that in Region V firm C does not have 
enough capacity 
the monopoly in the final-product market can expand its demand by supplying the rest of 
its component demand from firm T. The size of the region where firm C does not sell in 
the final-product market (Regions V and VI) depends on the degree of competition 
between the final products. As competition of the two products intensifies ( decreases), 
the sizes of Regions V and VI increases. This is because firms O and C can avoid this 
intense competition by being monopolies in the final-product market and in the 
component markets, respectively.
2.5
Contract manufacturers sometimes have the proprietary rights to produce the component, 
but after the patent has expired, other suppliers can also produce it. For instance, 
Qualcomm served as the proprietary supplier of the CDMA chips for cell phone 
producers, and
CDMA (Mock, 2005), resulting in an increase of competition in the cell-phone-chip 
manufacturing market. 
The purpose of this section is to evaluate the impact of competition in the 
component market. In particular, in the main model, I assume that the component is not 
proprietary, such that firm O has the option of multi-sourcing from multiple potential 
suppliers (firms C and T). In this section, I consider a benchmark scenario in which the 
component is of a proprietary nature, and firm C is the only supplier that can produce the 
component. Firm C deploys one of the following strategies: (1) monopoly does not
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supply the component to firm O (e.g., sets a very high wholesale price) such that firm C 
holds the monopoly in selling the final product, (2) supplier only acts as a supplier for
firm O but does not enter the final-product market, and (3) coopetitor supplies
components to firm O and sells final products to customers.
When firm C does not supply components to firm O (monopoly), firm O earns
:
(2.7)
s.t. (2.8)
When firm C supplies components to firm O and does not sell a final product in the final-
product market (supplier only
(2.9)
s.t. (2.10)
When firm C sells components to firm O and also sells final products in final-product 
market (coopetitor), profit is:
(2.11)
s.t. (2.12)
While under the monopoly strategy, firm O nder the component-supplier 
and coopetitor scenarios, firm O is:
(2.13)
The game sequence under the benchmark is as follows:
1) Firm C decides on its strategy (monopoly, component supplier, coopetitor).
2) If applicable, firm C decides .
3) If applicable, firm C decides and firm O decides .
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I use backward induction to find the equilibrium solutions; the derivation of 
equilibrium is presented in Appendix-A. I denote the optimal profit of firm O under the 
benchmark to be , and I define the value of competition to firm O as .
Recall that denotes the equilibrium profit of firm O in the main model. Then,
Proposition 2.5 examines how the capacity and competition in the final-product market 
affect the value of competition in the component market. (The value of competition from 
the perspective of firm C is the reverse of that from the perspective of firm O.)
Proposition 2.5:
a. The value of competition in the component market decreases in capacity: .
b. The value of competition in the component market decreases in the intensity of 
competition in the final-product market: .
c. Firm O is always better off if there is more than one supplier: .
Under the benchmark scenario, w
wholesale price increases significantly because the CCM holds the monopoly in the 
component market. On the other hand, the wholesale price would be relatively insensitive 
to the capacity under the main model because of competition in the component market. 
Therefore, the value of competition in the component market is large when capacity 
decreases.
When the competing products are highly substitutable (i.e., small ), firm C has 
less incentive to allocate its capacity to firm O, so one might expect the value of 
competition in the component market to be large. However, I find that the opposite 
impact holds. 
Consider the case where firm C supplies components to firm O under the 
profit is relatively insensitive to the product substitutability under the benchmark 
because, when it serves as the proprietary component supplier, firm C would set a 
wholesale price to extract as much profit from firm O as possible. On the other hand, 
under the main model, the wholesale price would be relatively insensitive to product 
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substitutability because of competition in the component market. As firm O stands to gain 
more when the product becomes less substitutable under the main model, the value of 
competition in the component market increases in M.
Despite the fact that the value of competition might decrease for firm O 
or product substitutability, Proposition 2.5c shows that 
firm O always prefers to have more than one outsourcing option. This preference relates 
to the fact that the availability of alternative outsourcers would provide firm O with more 
bargaining power when designing a contract with the supplier.
2.6
In the main model, I have assumed that firm O cannot order excess quantity. However, 
-product market by using a 
portion of the capacity, thereby mitigating competition in the final-product market, firm 
O might have the incentive to order more than its demand. Specifically, in the second 
step of the game, firm O decides how much to order from firm C and how much to order 
from firm T.
The analysis of this game is similar to the main model, though much more 
-quantity constraint. The proofs are available from authors 
upon request. In summary, it can be shown that the general structure of the equilibrium 
stays the same. Similar to the findings presented in Proposition 2.4a, firm C is better off 
not selling in the final-product market since product substitution increases in the presence 
of the buy-and-hold option. However, when there is a buy-and-hold option, the degree of 
product substitutability that is required for firm C to prefer to drop out of the final-
product market is lower compared to the main model, where firm O does not have the 
buy-and-hold option. This is because firm O does not need to price its products low when 
it can have excess order quantity, so it may be better off selling its products for a
monopoly price and keeping the extra components at no cost. Consequently, firm O 
would be willing to pay 
monopoly in the final-product market. In turn, firm C has a larger wholesale price so it 
would not sell in the final-product market even when the products are less substitutable. 
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When firm C sells its own product to the end customer, firm O would never 
utilize the buy-and-hold option. This is because firm C would set a sufficiently high 
wholesale price when selling to end customers, so firm O would outsource to firm T 
instead. Moreover, firm O would exercise the buy-and-hold only when firm C has a 
relatively large capacity (Region VI) because, otherwise, would always 
be (Region V). Therefore, the existence of the buy-
and-hold option for firm O would largely affect the area under which firm C is the 
supplier only and firm O is single-sourcing from firm C, thus making this strategy 
optimal for a larger set of parameters. I show that all of the results in the main model hold 
in the presence of the buy-and-hold option.
2.7
In this chapter, I examine the impact of capacity on the optimal channel structure when 
the contract manufacturer may have a competing product. Using a game theoretical 
approach to study the dynamics of strategic decisions allows us to better 
understand the effect of various fact factors that might not be 
present in single-case or multiple-case study.
I show that capacity limitation, which is a commonly experienced conflict among 
contract manufacturers, can have nontrivial impacts. In particular, when firms act as 
supply chain partners, the CCM might reduce its own product output in order to fulfill the
Thus, I present an explanation for both prioritizing capacity 
to a such as the strategy used by Franz in the motivating example)
and reducing the a
competitor (such as the motivating example of TPV technologies). However, the former 
strategic move (by Franz) can be justified whenever a firm has limited capacity that can 
satisfy its own demand only, and the latter strategy (by TPV technology) becomes more 
plausible whenever a firm has a lot of excess capacity to accommodate OBM orders as 
well as most of its own demand. Furthermore, I characterize the conditions under which 
the OBM might benefit from multi-sourcing its component. I show the competition in the 
final-
capacity while outsourcing the rest of the component demand to a third-party supplier.
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I
capacity increases. Interestingly, I find that the
capacity, and this deterioration becomes more severe when firms are supply-chain 
partners. For example, since 2014, LG Display produces the OLED screens used by 
OBMs like Apple and also by its own firm, LG Electronics. Due to increasing demand in 
electronic markets, LG Display is planning to expand its production capacity to 
accommodate both OBMs (e.g., Apple) and its own brand supply needs 
(Fingas, 2015). However, my results show that it might be better for a contract 
manufacturer in this example, LG Electronics to limit the output of its own product in 
order to maintain higher market prices and thus reduce market competition. Therefore, in 
terms of managerial insights and implications, my results suggest that increasing capacity 
level may be harmful to the industry. Finally, I show that, in the component market, the
value of competition to the OBM is small when the two products are highly substitutable.
Moreover, the results of my study provide strategic insights for practicing 
managers when their firms compete with a supplier that has limited capacity. In 
particular, when there is a need for capacity expansion to reach economies of scale, the
, 2008). However, my results show that
if the competitors can share the capacity, the increase in capacity levels may result in a 
more profitable industry rather than a price war. Such insight would increase the 
desirability of cooperating with competitors when there is a potential to achieve 
economies of scale through increased capacity levels.
I used but
this model had some limitations. I used a deterministic demand model, so a possible 
avenue of future research would be to analytically study the impact of demand 
uncertainty on the capacity-allocation problem of a CCM. Moreover, in my model, I
considered only one competitive contract manufacturer that can produce a competitive 
product. It would be interesting to consider multiple strategic contract manufacturers, 
each with the option of producing their own brand products.
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Chapter 3
3
In this chapter I examine performance-based payment contracts to promote the optimal 
use of an optional diagnostic test for newly diagnosed cancer patients. This study is
inspired by three trends: tremendous increases in the cost of new, advanced cancer drugs; 
development of new diagnostic tests to allow physicians to tailor treatment to patients; 
and changes in healthcare funding models that reward quality care. I model the 
interaction between two parties a healthcare payer and an oncologist, in which the 
the payer does not know whether the oncologist takes the optimal course of action (moral 
hazard). I show that, in the presence of information asymmetry, an oncologist should 
never test all patients, even if the diagnostic test is available for free. Moreover, although 
ays benefit 
from this private information. I also find that social welfare might increase as a result of 
I show that it is not always socially optimal to make a diagnostic test compulsory even if 
such a policy can be implemented for free.
3.1
Cancer is the second leading cause of death in the United States, accounting for over 
580,000 deaths in 2013 (Center for Disease Control and Prevention 2013). The American 
Cancer Society estimates that there will be over 1,680,000 new cancer diagnoses in 2016 
(American Cancer Society 2016). Cancer treatment typically consists of a combination of 
surgery, radiation therapy, hormone treatment, and chemotherapy. In recent years, cancer 
treatment costs have risen dramatically with the development of a number of biologics 
and targeted treatments. For example, the cost of a course of therapy with trastuzumab 
(Herceptin) for breast cancer is estimated at $30,000 (Hornberger et al. 2005); the cost of 
a course of therapy with bevacizumab (Avastin) for colorectal cancer is approximately 
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$90,000 (Picard 2012), and other drugs have been developed with a wide range of 
monthly costs per patient (Campbell 2015).
In addition to growth in the number and cost of treatment options available, there 
has also been growth in the availability and use of personalized medicine, often 
implemented through genetic and gene-expression profiling tests, which can help guide 
cancer diagnosis and treatment decisions. In some jurisdictions, a KRAS test is required 
prior to treatment with cetuximab or panitimuab for colorectal cancer, based on evidence 
that these drugs are not effective in patients with mutations in the KRAS gene (Díaz-
Rubio et al. 2012). The 21-gene assay for breast cancer (Oncotype Dx) generates a 
recurrence score based on the expression of 21 genes. The score is interpreted as the 
probability of cancer recurrence within 10 years and is used to guide adjuvant 
chemotherapy treatment decisions. In particular, women with a high recurrence score are 
advised to undergo adjuvant chemotherapy, whereas women with a low recurrence score 
may avoid adjuvant chemotherapy as it provides limited benefits but is associated with 
harmful side effects. A gene expression profiling test for cancer of unknown primary (the 
Tissue of Origin test) examines the expression of more than 2,000 genes and produces a 
15 common types. This test can help to guide treatment decisions by directing treatment 
towards the most appropriate agents for a given type of cancer instead of using a general, 
non-specific treatment regimen. These diagnostic tests are an important element of 
personalized medicine since individualized treatment cannot be prescribed in the absence 
of this type of information. 
The costs of these tests vary from less than $500 for single-gene tests like KRAS 
(Behl et al. 2012) to $4,000 or more for multi-gene tests (e.g., Oncotype Dx costs $4,175 
(Ray 2011) and Tissue of Origin costs $3,750 (Tansey 2008)). Use of many of these tests 
is supported by clinical guidelines (Allegra et al. 2009, Carlson and Roth 2013) and a 
number of health technology assessments (e.g., Hannouf et al. 2012, Nerurkar et al. 2014,
Hannouf et al. 2016). However, the uptake of these advanced tests is low despite 
espite solid scientific 
evidence and endorsement by oncology societies for multi-gene tests supporting therapy 
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decision-making in breast cancer, only a small percentage of women are able to safely 
skip chemotherapy through personalized medicine In the United States, 90 percent of 
people have insurance plans that cover the Oncotype Dx test, yet only 27 percent of 
eligible cancer patients used the test in 2010 (Enewold et al. 2015).
To help manage chemotherapy costs and incentivize physicians to provide high-
quality care, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) has developed a 
new funding model called the Oncology Care Model (OCM). The OCM payment scheme 
-month episode of treatment that is based on the 
average treatment cost of patients with similar health conditions. Under OCM, providers 
receive payments based on a fee-for-service (FFS) model where the providers are 
compensated based on the volume of services performed. At the end of each treatment 
status, if the total cost of treatment is below the target price (Cms.gov 2015). The OCM 
thus creates conflicting objectives in managing care: while the target price aims to limit 
the treatment cost, the reward payments give physicians the flexibility of choosing more 
health status.
The OCM is part of a more general type of payment reform that focuses on 
performance-based bundled payments. Several other examples have been developed. For 
instance, CMS introduced a 5-year payment program in April 2016 for lower extremity 
joint replacement called the Comprehensive Care for Joint Replacement (CJR) Model. 
Under the CJR model, hospitals will be compensated based on a target price that aims to
cover the total cost of an episode of treatment, defined as the period that starts with an 
admission to a participating hospital and ends 90 days post-discharge. Hospitals may also 
receive quality incentive payments based on the health outcome of patients. Similarly, the 
Cardiac Rehabilitation Incentive Payment Model was introduced by the Department of 
Health and Human Services (HHS) in 2016. Participating hospitals will receive quality 
incentive payments as well as a bundled payment for a 90-day care period following 
hospital discharge for patients hospitalized for a heart attack or bypass surgery. Recent 
studies suggest that there is growing interest in bundled payment models by healthcare
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payers (Japsen 2015, Whitman 2016). Bundled payment models accounted for 15 percent
of insurers spending in 2014 (Evans 2014) and there is evidence that these payment 
models have resulted in positive outcomes (Korda and Eldridge 2011).
In this essay, I develop a stylized physician compensation model inspired by the
growing use of advanced diagnostic testing technologies in cancer care. Although 
diagnostic tests are not explicitly included in OCM, the growing number of expensive 
testing technologies and the need to ensure the appropriate use of these tests suggests a 
need to include them in future funding models. Thus, my research explores what a 
bundled payment mechanism should look like if diagnostic tests are available. The 
central problem analyzed in this chapter was identified in a report by consulting firm 
McKinsey and Co., which described one of the barriers to adopting new testing 
technologies for personalized medicine as the difficulty of enforcing standard protocols 
to ensure that physicians follow through with appropriate patient care based on test 
results .
My model involves interaction between a healthcare payer (payer) who pays for 
the test and advanced treatment option (e.g., adjuvant chemotherapy), and an oncologist 
(provider) who makes decisions regarding the use of the test and the advanced treatment 
for patients. Patients are heterogeneous, with different risks of cancer recurrence. Since 
the recurrence probability can only be known if the test is used, patients appear to be 
homogeneous members of different risk groups if the test is not used. The payer offers a 
payment contract to providers to maximize social welfare, defined as the monetary value 
of health outcomes minus the total costs of providing care. Depending on the payment 
structure offered by the payer, the provider chooses one of three treatment options: 1) 
Treat all patients with an advanced treatment option without ordering the test; 2) Do not 
order the test and do not treat with an advanced treatment option; or 3) Order the test and 
only treat those patients with advanced treatment option whose recurrence probability is 
sufficiently high. While in the main analysis I assume that the provider decides whether 
to use the test or not, in some cases the test can be made compulsory (e.g., KRAS); 
therefore, in Section 6 I extend my analysis to the case where the test is compulsory for 
all patients.
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The contract design problem is complicated by information asymmetry in the 
system. First, there are many patient characteristics that are observed by physicians but
are not formally recorded in any clinical or administrative databases held by the payer
(adverse selection). Second, the payer also does not know which factors the physician
considered when making the treatment decision, so the payer does not know whether the 
optimal course of action is used by the provider (moral hazard). To incentivize the 
provider to use the test whenever it is beneficial and to appropriately follow the 
recommendation of the test results whenever the test is used, the payer offers a menu of
contracts consisting of a fixed payment per episode of treatment, and reward payments 
that are based on patients health and on whether or not treatment is applied. 
The underlying problem has a structural novelty in that the 
use an advanced treatment option is conditional on his decision to order the diagnostic 
test. Therefore, finding the optimal menu of contracts is a challenging problem as the 
I construct the optimal
provider. 
My study yields several interesting findings that have policy implications. First, I
show how the payer can design contracts such that the provider may not be able to take 
advantage of his private information. In this optimal contract structure, the payer should 
incorporat contracts. In particular, the payer 
should offer reward payments for not treating certain types of patients with an advanced 
treatment option. This finding underlines empirical evidence on over-prescription of 
chemotherapy treatment (Smith and Hillner 2010
not always depend on using the most expensive technology available. Furthermore, it 
shows that the advent of new diagnostic tests necessitates new reimbursement models
because current payment models do not account for treatment choices made by the 
providers. 
Second, if the test is relatively inexpensive, then it may seem natural that the 
provider should order the diagnostic test for all patients. Interestingly, when the test is 
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optional and there is imperfect information flow between the payer and the provider, I
find that the payer should motivate the provider to only test certain types of patients, even 
if the diagnostic test can be available for free. This is in agreement with empirical 
evidence showing that some new technologies might not be cost-effective even if they 
can be acquired for free (Davis 2014, Davis and Akehurst 2016). However, under 
complete information it is optimal to test all patients when the test cost is sufficiently 
low. This result highlights the importance of information flow in the healthcare system
and provides the first step in estimating the value gained by enhancing administrative 
databases held by the payer.
Third, I find that an increase in reputational concerns and altruistic behavior of a 
provider may increase social welfare. This result is inline with the inconsistent evidence 
regarding the impact of malpractice pressure on healthcare systems (Avraham and 
Schanzenbach 2010, Reyes 2010, Cotet 2012, Lakdawalla and Seabury 2012, Dai et al. 
2016, Montanera 2016). Thus, I provide further support for Montanera (2016) who 
argues that tort reform, even if successful at reducing malpractice pressure, is not a 
achieving both cost reductions and quality improvements for 
all patients.
Finally, I show that it is not always socially optimal to make a diagnostic test 
compulsory even if there is no cost to implement such a policy. While compulsory testing 
could eliminate adverse selection, it does cause unnecessary testing of patients who are 
very likely to benefit (or not benefit) from an advanced treatment option based on their 
pre-test evaluation. Thus, this finding suggests that even if a diagnostic test is 
recommended by the guidelines, it might be better to leave the decision about ordering 
the test to the judgment of physicians instead of making the test compulsory for the 
whole population.
3.2
My study is primarily related to the stream of literature that considers design of
mechanisms (e.g., performance-based payment models) for healthcare systems. For 
example, there are studies that design performance-based contracts to improve patient 
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access to care (e.g., Jiang et al. 2012, Jiang et al. 2016, Savva et al. 2016). Jiang et al. 
(2012) consider contracts between a payer and a healthcare provider that serves a 
heterogeneous patient pool using an online appointment-scheduling system. They 
propose a threshold penalty-payment scheme to reach a desired patient waiting time
(performance measure). Jiang et al. (2016) and Savva et al. (2016) study performance-
based incentives when there is direct competition among providers. In these studies,
performance measure is included in the proposed contracts. However, in my study,
performance measure that is a 
included as a contract term. Fuloria and Zenios (2001) also design performance-based 
, which was 
established in 1973 to provide affordable dialysis care for ESRD patients. They assume 
that all patients are homogeneous with the same probability function of experiencing 
complications or death after treatment. My work differs in that I study heterogeneous 
patients that can only be sorted using a diagnostic test. Finally, Gupta and Mehrotra 
(2015) study the proposer selection problem of CMS for its
. Similar to my study, they find coordinating mechanisms to align 
the incentives of the payer and the provider. However, I focus on the heterogeneous 
patient pool visiting a provider that is already a participant of a payment program, while 
the providers.
There are also studies in healthcare operations management that analyze a 
nostic tests in various healthcare settings. 
Motivated by the utilization of cancer screening tests, Yaesoubi and Roberts (2011) study 
optimal reimbursement contracts between a payer and a healthcare provider. The provider 
is assumed to only care about the cost of treatment, and thus the health outcome of a
patient does not affect the treatment choice of the provider. Conversely, I consider the 
case where the provider is concerned about patient health outcome. Moreover, I study 
the effects of an optional diagnostic test that can help the provider when deciding on 
treatment, whereas in Yaesoubi and Roberts (2011), the use of a particular test is the 
. Dai et al. (2016) study the effect of different service 
environments (e.g., provide
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-ordering behavior. Their study is focused on general diagnostic tests, such 
as MRI or EKG, that are used to identify whether a patient has a disease.  In contrast, I
am interested in personalized medicine and diagnostic tests that identify if a patient (who
is already diagnosed with a disease) can benefit from a targeted therapy. Similar to my
s altruistic behavior and reputational concerns when 
patients are not properly treated, Dai et al. s
misdiagnosis concern and show that both over-testing and under-testing are possible 
outcomes of these concerns. Finally, Dai et al. (2015) study the use of an optional test on 
decision-making of a provider regarding the use of percutaneous coronary intervention 
(PCI) for coronary artery disease. Similar to my approach they assume some degree of 
altruistic behavior by providers and model it as a conflict of interest between financial 
gains and patients health outcome. They show that the incorporation of optional 
advanced testing into decision-making might have non-monotonic effects on the use of 
PCI depending on the amount of the pro my study, they 
the optional test and do not study the 
potential payment systems that might align the incentives of the payer and the provider.
Adida et al. (2016) study the effects that FFS and bundled payment models have 
on patient selection and the treatment intensity decisions made by a provider. Similar to
my model they consider a reputational penalty for the provider in case of a treatment 
failure. They find that the FFS model would result in overtreatment of patients. Guo et al. 
(2016) also compares the FFS model with a bundled payment model in a setting where 
patients are sensitive to waiting times. They show that when the patient pool is 
sufficiently small the bundled payment model dominates the FFS model in all 
performance measures. Similar to my study they find optimal reimbursement policy of a 
payer who maximizes the patient welfare. Andritsos and Tang (2015) consider a co-
managed situation where both the provider and the patient can exert effort to reduce the
readmission rate. They show that bundled payment outperforms FFS by causing the 
provider and the patient to exert more effort to reduce readmission. These studies 
investigate incentive problems in healthcare systems in order to compare the outcome of 
different payment models, but they do not consider performance-based bundled 
payments. In this chapter, I model newly proposed payment models that reward providers 
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for higher quality of care and design performance-based payment contracts that align the 
incentives of the payer and the provider while achieving socially optimal treatment 
levels. To the best of my knowledge, I am the first to study the use of performance-based 
contracts to coordinate the incentives of a healthcare payer and a provider while
examining the impact of an optional diagnostic test on decision-making 
process.
3.3
I consider a system that consists of a payer, a provider, and a pool of newly diagnosed 
patients who are eligible for an optional diagnostic test. I extend the analysis to a case 
where the diagnostic test is compulsory in Section 6. In this section, I consider a system 
profile) and moral hazard (the payer does not know whether or not the treatment that is 
recommended by the test result is followed). The provider makes the testing and 
treatment decisions, and the payer incentivizes the provider with a payment contract in 
order to maximize social welfare. Consistent with current practice for the Oncotype Dx 
and Tissue of Origin tests, I assume that the test result is sent directly to the provider. I
assume that the provider incurs the treatment cost (e.g., chemotherapy cost plus costs 
associated with administering treatment and monitoring patients) and is compensated via 
his contract with the payer, while the test cost is directly billed to the payer. Throughout 
the chapter I an advanced treatment option, such as 
targeted therapy, that would be recommended from the results of a diagnostic test. Thus, 
whenever I a
patient with a specific treatment (e.g., chemotherapy or a targeted treatment), but the 
patient will still be treated by other means that are appropriate given her pre-test
diagnosis (e.g., hormone therapy or empiric chemotherapy).
The risk profile of the 
patients is private information to the provider because the provider is able to make 
several observations about each patient that are not known to the payer. An example of
private information is can influence many factors such as 
adherence to medication recommendations and preventive measures to prevent 
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recurrence, and thus influence the success of a given treatment recommendation. Other 
examples include detailed family history or various risk factors that are disclosed to a 
physician but not formally recorded in patient charts. In addition, the results of some lab 
administrative databases, the payer may know that a test has been ordered (because of an 
associated billing code), but not know the result of the test. A proliferation of new tests, 
each with their own reporting standards, will likely exacerbate this problem. For instance, 
likely tissue of or
would require customization of existing databases, which may not be a priority for the 
payer, particularly if the tests are used for rare conditions. The extent of this source of 
information asymmetry will vary among payers depending on the structure of their health 
records systems and their sophistication in using the information collected but even for 
a sophisticated payer, the physician will know more about a patient than the payer does.
For this analysis, without loss of generality, I normalize the number of patients of 
the provider to one. I assume that patients can be one of two types: high-risk (type- ) and 
low-risk (type- ). The recurrence probability (risk score) of type- patients is
characterized by a random variable, , with corresponding distributions 
and with density functions and . Thus, the expected recurrence 
probability of type- patients is . I assume that patients risk
distribution function is continuous and strictly increasing on . Since type-
patients have a higher expected recurrence probability than type- patients, I assume that 
for all . The provider can observe the type but does not know a s
recurrence probability unless the patient undergoes the test, and ordering the test
provider. The payer only knows the 
probability of the patient type to be of type- with probability , where .
I assume that treatment can reduce the recurrence probability to , where 
hazard ratio is small. This assumption is consistent with the use of the 21-gene assay 
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for breast cancer where the original validation study found that the difference in the 
probability of recurrence for women treated with chemotherapy versus hormone therapy 
alone was increasing in the recurrence score (Paik et al. 2006).
The payer offers a menu of contracts that depends on the patient 
type, . The contracts consist of the following three terms: 1) A fixed bundled payment 
for an episode of treatment ( ), 2) a reward for stable health of treated patients ( ), and 
3) a reward for stable health of patients who are not treated ( ). The first term of the 
contract ( ) only pays for quantity of treatment and captures the most widely 
implemented payment method in different healthcare systems. For example, can be 
interpreted as FFS payment when it covers the cost of an episode of treatment. However, 
when is different from the total cost of the treatment it can be interpreted as a target 
price (cf. CJR model) meaning that the provider might receive more or less than the 
total cost of the treatment. The next two terms are the performance-based payments that 
depend on the health outcome of patients as well as the treatment choice of the provider.
Note that, the payer might be able to benefit from the correlation between the health 
outcome of the patients and their risk profile by offering contract payments that are in
line with the most probable outcome corresponding to the patient type, i.e., including 
payment terms that reward the recurrence in high-risk patients (Riordan and Sappington 
1988). However, these payment structures are impractical and thus are not explored.
Figure 3.1 illustrates the sequence of events. 
Figure 3.1: Sequence of events
An episode of treatment costs for each patient. Every untreated patient with 
recurrence incurs a welfare loss that represents both the opportunity cost and 
psychological cost of a patient who is not properly treated. Thus, a payer that maximizes 
social welfare has to account for this welfare loss. I assume that this welfare loss will also 
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cause a disutility for the provider. 
disutility as being either a result of a loss of reputation (Adida et al. 2016) or disutility 
caused by altruism about patients' health (Montanera 2016). I do not argue for either but 
instead claim to be an aggregate value representing both effects. When ,
adverse patient outcomes cause no disutility for the provider i.e., no damage to the 
welfare of his patients. I examine the impact of on social welfare in Section 5.
There is a net monetary benefit associated with a patient with no recurrence 
(i.e., stable health) and in case of recurrence, . Treatment may be associated 
with toxicities and adverse events. These cause to
decrease by , which is the expected cost of adverse events. I assume that is 
independent of on the grounds that adverse events are driven by specific drug regimens, 
whereas is driven by genetic risk factors.
3.3.1
For each patient, the provider has to decide whether or not to order the test and whether 
or not to treat the patient. 
Remark 3.1: If the provider orders the test, then the provider chooses a threshold for
each patient type and only treats patients whose recurrence probability is higher than 
this threshold (i.e., ). This is a result of the recurrence probability being 
continuous and monotonic, and the treatment effect being proportional to the recurrence 
probability (i.e., ).
Because the risk score of a patient is only revealed if the test is ordered, the 
treatment threshold ( ) decision of the provider is conditional on his test-ordering 
decision. I use a binary variable to denote whether the provider orders the test 
( ) or not ( ) when patients are of type- . Thus, for a given patient type, the 
provider has three options (Figure 3.2): Option 0 treat patients without ordering the 
test; Option 1 do not order the test and do not treat patients; and Option 2 order the 
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test and treat patients only if their recurrence probability is higher than a treatment 
threshold ( ).
Figure 3.2:
If the provider chooses to treat patients without ordering the test (Option 0), then
objective function is:
The first two terms are the fixed bundled payment less the cost for an episode of 
treatment and the third term is the reward payment for treated patients with stable health. 
If the provider chooses not to order the test and not to treat patients (Option 1), then the
objective function is: 
The first term is the reward payment for untreated patients with stable health. The second 
term is the provider recurrence. Finally, 
if the provider orders the test (Option 2) and only treats patients if their recurrence score 
is above the treatment threshold ( ), then objective function is:
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The first term is the fixed bundled payment less the cost for an episode of treatment for 
treated patients. The second and the third terms are the reward payments for untreated 
and treated patients with stable health, and the last term is the provider
untreated patients experience a recurrence. A similar approach has been widely used in 
concerns regarding the health outcome of the patients (e.g., Dai et al. 2015, Adida et al. 
2016, Dai et al. 2016, Montanera 2016). 
contracts offered by the payer , by choosing the treatment choice for 
each patient type.
3.3.2
I assu
assuming 
the cost of the test is , pe- is:
The first two terms are the monetary benefit, less the reward payments to the provider, 
for untreated and treated patients with stable health. The third and the fourth terms are the 
monetary benefit for untreated and treated patients with recurrence. The fifth and the 
sixth terms are the payments for an episode of treatment and the test cost. Note that the 
test cost can only be incurred if the provider orders the test, i.e, setting under 
Option 2. The payer decides on the payment contracts that link the two parties. The payer 
solves the following program. 
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information asymmetry. The (optimal treatment choice) constraints are moral 
hazard incentive constraints to ensure that under the payment contracts the
. The next two constraints ( and )
-compatibility constraints. They ensure that 
the provider prefers contract for type- patients to the contract for the other patient type 
and thus prevent patient misrepresentation. Note that, if the provider misrepresents a 
patient he may also choose to change the treatment choice. This is represented by the 
-hand side of the and constraints. In 
particular, constraint means that when a provider faces a low-risk patient, he would 
be better off choosing the contract that is designed for low-risk patients. Similarly, 
constraint ensures that a provider would choose a contract designed for high-risk patients 
when he faces a high-risk patient. The last two constraints ( and ) are the 
provid -rationality constraints for each patient type
meaning that the contracts for each patient type result in non-negative payoff for the 
provider.
I derive the equilibrium solution following the standard approach (Laffont and 
Martimort 2001; Chapter 7, Bolton and Dewatripont 2005; Chapter 6). A similar 
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approach is used in other papers that consider both adverse selection and moral hazard 
(e.g., Yaesoubi and Roberts 2011, Xiao and Xu 2012, Chick et al. 2016). Specifically, 
first, based on the extended revelation principle (Laffont and Martimort 2001; page 258),
I restrict my attention to direct mechanisms where the contracts are a pair of optimal 
treatment choices for the two patient types (i.e., and ). Next, 
because the provider is exposed to higher risk when treating high-risk patients, the 
-risk patients to have 
higher expected value than the contact for low-risk patients. Therefore, for high-risk
patients the provider would not deviate to the contract designed for low-risk patients, and 
thus will not bind at the optimum. Furthermore, the provider has an incentive to 
misrepresent low-risk patients as high-risk patients, so for low-risk patients the provider 
can benefit from his private information, and thus will not bind at the optimum. 
Thus, omitting and the constraints and are binding at the optimum for 
all treatment choices of the provider.2
maximization problem where the payer chooses optimal contracts subject to the two 
binding constraints ( and 
private information (moral hazard), the payer chooses payment terms such that the 
The underlying problem is novel in the sense that the provider has two decisions 
and the treatment threshold decision is conditional on the test-ordering decision. 
whereas the test-ordering decision is public information. Therefore, if the provider does 
not order the test for a patient, the payer knows that the provider has chosen to treat or 
Given that the treatment threshold decision is conditional on the test-ordering decision, 
the provider has nine treatment choices because there are two patient types and three 
                                                
2 To relate to the literature in the supply chain coordination (e.g., et al., 2012; Huang et al 
2015; Yan et al., 2015), the provider with a high-risk patient corresponds to the supplier with a lower
capability (high cost or low quality), and vice versa. Therefore, IRL and ICH are binding in those papers, 
while IRH and ICL are binding in my study.
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treatment options per patient type. I
each of the nine treatment choices (cf. Table A.3 in Appendix-B). In the equilibrium 
solution, given the model parameters the payer offers a menu of contracts that results in 
one of the nine treatment choices with the highest social welfare. The full details on the 
derivation of the equilibrium solution are shown in Appendix-B.
3.4
In this section, I present the optimal solution for the system with information asymmetry
(second-best policy). In Subsection 3.4.1, I analyze a system with full information (first-
best policy) to understand the inefficiencies caused by private information of the 
provider. I also explain how the proposed payment model outperforms current payment 
models in Subsection 3.4.2.
Define as the critical treatment threshold; is large when 
the treatment adverse effect ( ) or the treatment cost ( ) is large, or when the cost 
behavior ( ) is small. 
Lemma 3.1 presents a property of the optimal treatment threshold choice of the provider.
Lemma 3.1: When the provider orders the test ( ), the optimal treatment threshold
is the same for both patient types and is equal to the critical treatment threshold (i.e., 
).
Lemma 3.1 states that in the optimal solution the payer designs contracts such that 
when the provider orders the test he will choose the same treatment threshold for both 
patient types that is equal to the critical treatment threshold. This is because the treatment 
about treatment and the determination of this marginal patient is independent of the full 
distribution of risks for the patient type . Thus, the change to social welfare from 
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For expositional convenience, I define where 
-risk patients 
versus low-risk patients. The value is zero when the distributions of risk of the two 
types are identical; it increases in the difference between the two types of patients and in 
the treatment threshold . I define the following thresholds:
(3.6)
(3.7)
solves (3.8)
(3.9)
(3.10)
Threshold can be interpreted as the maximum willingness-to-pay for the test. 
There is a trade-off between the cost of the test and the expected risk to the patients. If 
the expected risk to the patients is much lower (higher) than the treatment threshold, then 
there is only a small probability that a patient would (would not) require treatment given 
the test results. Therefore, as the distance between the expected risk and the treatment 
threshold gets larger, the value of the test diminishes because the probability of making 
similar treatment decisions with and without the test gets higher.
Lemma 3.2: Define and
. If or , then the patients are never treated.
Lemma 3.2 shows that if the cost of adverse events is sufficiently large ( ) or 
the treatment is sufficiently costly ( ), then the patients would never be treated. In 
that case, it is clearly never optimal to order the test. For the remainder of the chapter, I
focus on the interesting region where and .
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Proposition 3.1 presents the optimal solution for the system with information asymmetry 
(second-best policy), and is illustrated in Figure 3.3.
Proposition 3.1: The optimal solution for the system with information asymmetry is one 
of the following five cases:
Case 1: For both patient types, do not order the test and treat the patients if and 
only if and
Case 2: For type-L patients, order the test and treat the patients with ; For 
type-H patients, do not order the test and treat the patients if and only if 
and
Case 3: For type-L patients, do not order the test and do not treat the patients; 
For type-H patients, do not order the test and treat the patients if and only if 
and and 
Case 4: For type-L patients, do not order the test and do not treat the patients; 
For type-H patients, order the test and treat the patients with if and only if 
and
Case 5: For both patient types, do not order the test and do not treat the patients 
if and only if and
Figure 3.3: Optimal treatment decisions for the system with information asymmetry
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Consider the case where the cost of the diagnostic test is sufficiently high, such 
that the payer should not motivate the provider to order the test, regardless of the patient 
type (Cases 1, 3, 5). In all three cases, the potential benefit of ordering the test that is, 
directing treatment to those patients that derive the greatest benefit does not justify the 
testing cost. It is analogous to public health and health policy guidelines (e.g., for 
screening, vaccination, etc.) where the guideline varies in the population prevalence. For 
example, one analysis of HIV screening concluded that one-time screening in the general 
population might be cost-effective in areas where HIV prevalence exceeds 3.0 percent 
(Paltiel et al. 2005).
Next, consider the case where the diagnostic test is relatively inexpensive ( is
small), such that social welfare may increase if the provider orders the test for the patients 
(Cases 2, 4). When the critical treatment threshold is small (Case 2), the provider 
should test low-risk patients, and treat them when their recurrence probability is larger 
than . However, in Case 2, high-risk patients are expected to have a recurrence risk 
larger than the threshold , so the payer should design a contract that motivates the 
provider to treat high-risk patients without ordering the test. On the other hand, when the 
critical treatment threshold is large (Case 4), the provider should test high-risk patients 
and treat them when their recurrence probability is larger than . However, in Case 4, 
low-risk patients are expected to have a recurrence risk lower than the critical treatment 
threshold, so the payer should design a contract that motivates the provider to neither test 
nor treat low-risk patients.
Corollary 3.1 shows how the provider may benefit from his private information.
Corollary 3.1: In Cases 1, 2, and 3, the patient type does not affect t
In Cases 4 and 5, the provider has a higher profit from treating low-risk patients than 
from treating high-risk patients.
In Cases 1, 2, and 3, the provider always treats high-risk patients. As a result, the 
payer can design a contract for the provider for high-risk patients that (1) does not require 
any reward payments (i.e., and ), and (2) sets the fixed per patient 
treatment bundled payment for an episode of treatment to be the treatment cost (i.e., 
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), leading to the provider having zero profit. Note that this contract structure is 
provider with low-risk patients would also have the same profit if he were to pick this 
contract (incentive-compatibility constraint - ). As a result, the payer can design a 
contract such that the provider would also have zero profit from low-risk patients. Thus, 
In Cases 4 and 5, the provider should not always treat high-risk patients, so the 
payer must design a contract that includes reward payments for not treating high-risk
patients (i.e., ). While treating high-risk patients will have no profit for the 
provider ( is binding), the provider would have a positive profit when picking this 
contract for low-risk patients. This is because not treating low-risk patients with the 
advanced treatment option has less risk for the provider. Therefore, to prevent the 
provider from misrepresenting low-risk patients, the payer has to incentivize the provider 
by offering a profit larger than that offered for high-risk patients (i.e., information rent). 
In particular, the provider would have zero profit from high-risk patients in both cases, 
but the provider would have profit in Case 4, and in Case 5 from low-risk 
patients. (Recall that is
argument of is in Case 4 because the provider does not treat high-risk patients with 
recurrence risk smaller than , and the argument of is 1 in Case 5 because the provider 
never treats high-risk patients, which is equivalent to setting the treatment threshold to 
one.) 
Corollary 3.2 formally defines test cost thresholds beyond which it is never 
optimal to use the test.
Corollary 3.2: In the equilibrium solution, there exists an upper bound for the test cost 
such that
if then test is never ordered for high-risk patient type, and
if then test is never ordered for either patient type, and
.
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Corollary 3.2 shows that regardless of the risk level of the patients, there is a level 
for test cost ( ) beyond which it never makes sense to use the test. It is intuitive 
that a threshold for the test cost exists, since there is a trade-off between the cost of the 
test and the value of the test in terms of improved treatment decisions. However, it may 
seem counterintuitive that this threshold is higher for low-risk patients (i.e., 
). This is because in Case 4, the payer incurs information rent when motivating 
the provider to test high-risk patients (cf. Corollary 3.1). Therefore, ordering the test for 
high-risk patients will increase social welfare only when the test cost is low. On the other 
hand, in Case 2, the information rent is zero, and thus it is optimal for the payer to 
motivate the provider to test low-risk patients even at higher test cost amounts. 
Corollary 3.3 presents a property of the optimal contracts.
Corollary 3.3: All payment and reward terms are non-negative in the optimal contracts.
The payer can offer a contract with non-negative payment terms as long as the 
provider gets reward payments for stable health of patients who are not treated (i.e., 
). This is because the provider incurs a cost related to his reputation and his 
altruistic behavior when a recurrence happens to untreated patients, so the provider has an 
incentive to over-treat patients. The proposed contracts counteract this by compensating 
the provider for stable health of untreated patients. Thus, this result highlights the 
necessity of incentivizing the provider based on his treatment choice (such as 
incentivizing for not prescribing an episode of chemotherapy treatment for breast cancer 
patients). Having non-negative payments is a desirable feature of contract design in 
healthcare applications because negative payments might be impossible to implement in 
practice and could cause additional incentive problems. A similar issue has been noted in 
other papers on the topic (Yaesoubi and Roberts 2011, Chick et al. 2016).
Note that when the reward payments are zero (i.e., ), the resulting 
contracts are simple bundled payments (i.e., that only pay for the quantity of the 
treatment without any consideration of the quality of the treatment. These types of 
contracts are similar to the commonly used FFS payment models. I show that when it is 
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optimal to use the diagnostic test (Cases 2 and 4) the optimal contracts cannot be of this 
form. Consequently, the advent of new diagnostic tests makes current reimbursement 
models that only reward the intensity of work sub-optimal and necessitates development 
of alternative reimbursement models such as performance-based bundled payment 
models.
Corollary 3.4: Under the payment scheme proposed in this section, in the equilibrium of 
a system with information asymmetry it is never optimal to test patients from both patient 
risk profiles, even when the test is free (i.e., ).
Corollary 3.4 is true for all optimal cases presented in Proposition 3.1. In Case 2, 
where is relatively small (Figure 3.3), the cost of adverse events and treatment cost are 
relatively sm
patients. In this case, the provider treats high-risk patients without ordering the test; 
accordingly, as stated in Corollary 3.1, the provider will have zero profit from treating 
both patient types. If the provider were to test high-risk patients, the test results might 
suggest that a high-risk patient does not need to be treated; therefore, the provider would 
expect to have a disutility in case of a recurrence. This will require having higher-valued 
contract payment terms for high-risk patients if the provider were to order the test in Case 
2. Following higher-valued contracts for high-risk patients, to keep the provider from 
misrepresenting low-risk patients, the payer needs to offer higher-valued contracts for 
low-risk patients as well. As a result, in order to avoid the additional costs generated 
through higher-valued contract terms, in Case 2 the payer should not motivate the 
provider to order the test for high-risk patients. 
In Case 4, the cost for a recurrence in untreated patients is relatively small, and 
the provider neither tests nor treats low-risk patients. If the provider were to test low-risk
patients, there is a small probability that the test suggests a low-risk patient to be treated. 
However, the savings to the cost related to treating low-risk patients (as it might be 
suggested by the test) does not justify higher payment terms that is required to motivate 
the provider to test low-risk patients. Thus, in Case 4 the payer should not motivate the 
provider to test low-risk patients, even when the test is free. In Appendix-B I illustrate 
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how testing patients from both risk profiles always results in lower value for the payer 
regardless of the difference between the distributions of the two types of patients.
3.4.1 Full information
To examine whether the finding of Corollary 3.4 is due to decentralized decision-making 
or information asymmetry, I consider a system where there is a perfect information flow 
between the payer and the provider (first-best policy). The derivation of equilibrium of 
this system is presented in Appendix-B, and the equilibrium solution is illustrated in
Figure 3.4. The optimal treatment threshold in a system with perfect information is equal 
to the critical treatment threshold (
profile and thus is not affected by information asymmetry in the system. Unlike the 
system with information asymmetry (Proposition 3.1), under complete information there 
is a new optimal case (Case 6) where the payer should motivate the provider to order the 
test for both patient types. This occurs when the test cost is sufficiently low. This is 
because, in the full information scenario, social welfare is only affected by the health 
outcome of patients and not by private information of the provider. In the full information 
scenario, only a patient that can benefit from treatment is treated. However, when the 
provider has private information, not all patients who require treatment will be treated 
and not all the treated patients will benefit from the treatment. This finding illustrates the 
importance of information flow in a healthcare system in order to reduce the 
inefficiencies caused by the information asymmetry.
Remark 2: The highest willingness-to-pay for the test in the system with full information 
(first-
willingness-to-pay for the test in the system with information asymmetry ( ). This is 
because in Case 2 the provider does not benefit from his private information and thus the 
-to-pay for the test is not affected by the information asymmetry.
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Figure 3.4: Optimal treatment decisions for the system with full information
3.4.2 Alternate payment models
I also compare the proposed payment model with two other arrangements that are similar 
to currently implemented payment models. The derivation of equilibrium for these 
payment models are available from authors upon request. 
First, I analyze the performance of a single performance-based payment contract 
that is offered to both patient types (i.e., ) in a system with information 
asymmetry. This is similar to the OCM payment model. Under a single contract the payer 
cannot motivate the provider to treat each patient type differently. Therefore, the optimal 
treatment choices are Cases 1, 5 and 6. Note that, unlike in the full information scenario, 
in the presence of information asymmetry it is costly for the payer to test both patient 
types (Case 6) and thus this payment structure is always weakly dominated by the
proposed payment model (i.e., ).
Second, I analyze an alternative model where the payer offers a menu of contracts 
in which reward payments are only tied to the health outcome of a patient (i.e., 
). This is similar to the CJR payment model where a risk stratification 
methodology is used to set different target prices for different patient types. The optimal 
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treatment choices under this model are qualitatively similar to the 5 cases presented in 
Figure 3.3. However, the payment model that I propose can better utilize the optional 
diagnostic test by better managing the inefficiency in the system because by 
incorporating the treatment choice of the provider into the payment terms the payer can 
further reduce the information rent in Case 4. Both contract structures analyzed in this 
section have inferior performance to the proposed payment model, and hence emphasize 
the importance of development of alternative reimbursement models for different 
healthcare systems given the availability and use of personalized medicine.
3.5
In this section, I examine how social welfare is affected by treatment characteristics and 
For expositional convenience, I define:
(3.11)
Proposition 3.2 examines how social welfare is affected when untreated patients 
experience a recurrence.
Proposition 3.2:
a) Social welfare increases when the welfare loss of an untreated patient with 
recurrence has higher impact on the provider (i.e., increases) if and only if 
and .
b) Social welfare always decreases when the welfare loss of an untreated patient with 
recurrence ( ) increases.
One might expect that, due to a more restrictive participation constraint and the 
resulting overtreatment of patients, social welfare cannot increase when the provider is 
3.2.a 
formally states that this intuition does not always hold. In particular, when the provider 
does not treat low-risk patients but uses the test for high-risk patients (Case 4), social 
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welfare might increase as reputational concern and altruistic behavior of the provider 
increases. This result arises because when increases, the provider treating high-risk
patients, in order to decrease his risk exposure, would treat patients with higher 
probability (i.e., increases), which causes a decrease in the difference in the payments 
between low-risk and high-risk patient types. This allows the payer to design a contract 
such that the surplus utility for the provider treating low-risk patients to be smaller, 
Note that, this is only true when the expected recurrence probability of low-risk patients 
is sufficiently small that it results in a higher surplus utility for the provider when treating 
low-risk patients. The higher the surplus utility of the provider, the higher the potential 
gain for social welfare. Another interpretation for this finding that the social welfare 
might increase as increases could be that when is large, the provider becomes 
completely altruistic or has sufficiently high reputational concerns that there is reduced 
need to incentivize the provider through the reimbursement mechanism. Proposition 3.2.a 
is illustrated in Figure 3.5 using parameters listed in Table 3.1.
Proposition 3.2.b shows that I cannot observe the same impact on social welfare 
when the welfare loss of an untreated patient with recurrence ( ) increases. This is 
because an increase in the welfare loss of a patient has a direct negative impact on social 
welfare and cannot be compensated for by reducing the surplus utility of the provider.
Figure 3.5: Social welfare as a function of multiplier in Case 4
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Table 3.1: Parameter estimations for numerical examples
Model parameter Estimated value Source
Cost for an episode of treatment ( ) $30,000 Hornberger et al. (2005)*
Treatment adverse events ( ) $19,000 Hornberger et al. (2005) 
Monetary benefit from stable health ( ) $100,000 Shiroiwa et al. (2010) 
Monetary benefit from recurrence ( ) $60,000 Hornberger et al. (2005) §
Test cost ( ) $4,175 Ray (2011)
Probability of type-L ( ) 0.7 Assumption
Type-L patient distribution Assumption ¶
Type-H patient distribution Assumption ¶
* Estimates of adjuvant chemotherapy costs vary depending on the type of regimen used. I estimate the cost 
of a treatment episode per course of trastuzumab. 
-month period after an
episode of treatment, I only consider willingness-to-pay for one additional quality-adjusted life-year (QALY) 
gained.
§ Quality of life would drop to 0.7 when recurrence is stable, and to 0.5 when recurrence is progressive (base 
value 0.98). I use the average value of 0.6 to represent the average willingness-to-pay for QALY of patients 
with recurrence.
¶ These distributions are assumed for illustrative purposes. I conducted experiments with other distributions 
and obtained qualitatively similar results. 
Lastly, the impact of changes in treatment adverse effect , treatment cost and 
hazard ratio are intuitive and formally stated in Proposition 3.3.
Proposition 3.3: All else equal, the payer is always worse off as the treatment becomes 
less desirable (i.e., increase in , , or ), and this effect of treatment characteristics on 
the social welfare is always larger when the treatment threshold is relatively small.
3.6
There is a wide diversity in guidelines and recommendations for new diagnostic tests. In 
addition, many major guidelines are only updated every few years meaning that 
guidelines may lag technical developments. For instance, the Oncotype DX test is 
recommended by the American Society of Clinical Oncology and the U.S. National 
Comprehensive Cancer Network guidelines to be part of the routine practice for early 
stage breast cancer patients but not required as part of treatment (Ragaz 2010 B). Some 
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not recognized by any guidelines and the use of
decision. Other tests are compulsory; for example, KRAS test must be performed before 
treatment with cetuximab or panitimuab for colorectal cancer in Ontario.
In this section, I assume that the payer might make the use of diagnostic tests 
compulsory and implement a mechanism to verify test results before reimbursing 
treatment. I assume that in making the test compulsory the payer incurs a verification cost 
to gather and/or interpret the results otherwise there would still be a problem with 
asymmetric information.
The 
(3.12)
s.t
Program (3.12) is the modified version of the program (3.5) in the main model. 
The main difference is that there is no adverse selection because the payer acquires 
patient information and the test
However, I assume that there is still moral hazard because the payer cannot impose a 
treatment choice, as recommended by the test result, to the provider. Since the test is 
compulsory the provider always orders the test (i.e.,  ). Lemma 3.3 presents the 
region in which the payer can improve social welfare by making the test compulsory.
Lemma 3.3: Define 
. Then, if and only 
if:
and ;
Or
and
63
Proposition 3.4: It is not always socially optimal to make a diagnostic test compulsory 
even if such a policy can be implemented for free (i.e., ).
Figure 3.6: Compulsory test versus Optional test when 
Proposition 3.4 is illustrated in Figure 3.6. The shaded area in Figure 3.6 is the 
region where social welfare is higher when the test is compulsory. To make it easier to 
compare with the original case where the test is optional, I superimposed the shaded area 
on top of the graph from Figure 3.3 using the same scale on the y-axis. Figure 3.6 shows
that while making the diagnostic test compulsory removes the adverse selection, even if 
the payer can implement this policy for free (i.e., ) it is not always optimal to do 
so. This is because the test result does not have much value for patients whose expected 
recurrence probability is higher than the optimal treatment threshold ( ). Thus when is
small, if the test is used for all patients, the payer pays for a test that might only change 
the treatment choice for a small group of patients. However, the compulsory testing 
policy becomes more effective when the optimal treatment threshold is relatively large, 
such that there is a higher probability for patients to have recurrence score below the 
treatment threshold and thus a diagnostic test is needed to eliminate unnecessary 
treatment of low-risk patients.
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Corollary 3.5: There exists an upper bound for the test cost such that if it
is never optimal to make the test compulsory.
Corollary 3.5 formally shows the maximum test cost beyond which it is never 
optimal to make the test compulsory. However, as the verification cost for 
implementation of the policy increases, the shaded region in Figure 3.6 will shift down 
and compulsory testing will be optimal in a smaller region. Therefore, I can argue that 
while the maximum verification cost that justifies the compulsory testing depends on the 
test cost ( ), this threshold cannot be larger than the maximum test cost that makes the 
compulsory test optimal when (Lemma 3.3).
3.7
In this chapter I examined optimal design of contracts between a payer and a provider 
when an optional diagnostic test can be used to predict the benefits of an advanced 
treatment option. Following the general framework of OCM, the contracts include reward 
payments based on the health of patients at the end of a review period. The provider has 
private information abo
or not the optimal course of action is used (moral hazard). 
My research provides evidence for the necessity of developing alternative 
payment models; for the importance of enhancing payer
of tort reform on social welfare; and on the benefits of implementing compulsory testing 
policy. However, this essay is based on a stylized mathematical model with several 
limiting assumptions. While it is common to only study two types in systems with 
adverse selection (e.g., 
Xu 2012, Saghafian and Chao 2014, Yan et al. 2015) the analysis for multiple types can 
be derived using similar methodology (see Bolton and Dewatripont 2005). In this case, 
there will be multiple perceived risk distributions for patients (i.e., 
where is the distribution for the patients with the lowest risk and 
is the distribution for the patients with the highest risk). The payer will offer a menu of 
-compatibility and 
individual-rationality constraints. The provider will receive a zero profit from treating 
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patients with highest risk , and the provider might have a positive surplus for all 
other patient types (information rent). The challenging part of the derivation is to reduce 
the incentive-compatibility constraints because the provider might have an incentive to 
misrepresent the patients from higher-risk distributions as patients from lower-risk
distributions. However, given the structure of my findings, I expect that the main results 
of my study (such as non-negative contract terms and not using the test for all patient 
types even if it was free) will continue to hold when there are multiple types. 
Generalization of the underlying problem to other testing technologies may require 
explicit modeling of the sensitivity and specificity of the tests. I assumed that there is 
only one provider with a fixed number of visiting patients. Thus, using the proposed 
payment model, the payer cannot in a single 
agent system with private information. However, if patients have multiple options when 
deciding on which provider to visit, then a fruitful avenue of future research would be to 
consider competition among multiple providers. In such a competitive setting, the payer 
might be able to absorb all the information rent of for any treatment choice of the 
provider (see Cremer and McLean 1988, Demski and Sappington 1984).
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Chapter 4
4
4.1
Hip and knee replacements are the most common inpatient surgery for Medicare patients 
in the United States. The total cost for surgery, hospitalization, and recovery can vary 
dramatically among providers. For example, the cost of a total knee replacement 
procedure could range from $16,772 to $61,585 across different providers (Casey, 2015). 
The average cost for a total hip replacement procedure follows similar trends. In 2014, 
there were more than 400,000 hip and knee replacements procedures, costing more than 
$7 billion in hospitalization expenses alone. These procedures often require lengthy 
recovery and rehabilitation periods that increase the cost of the procedure. Demand for 
these procedures is expected to grow significantly over the next 10 years, to over 4 
million by 2030 an increase of 174% (Froemke et al., 2015). Despite the high volume 
of these surgeries, the quality and costs of care still vary greatly among providers. For 
instance, the rate of complications (e.g., infections, implant failures, etc.) after surgery 
can be more than three times higher at some facilities compared to others. These 
complications increase the chances that a patient may be readmitted to the hospital, which 
will further increase costs and may also reduce quality.
Consequently, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) introduced 
a five-year pay-for-performance program starting in April 2016 for lower extremity joint 
replacement (LEJR) called the Comprehensive Care for Joint Replacement (CJR) model. 
Under the CJR model, hospitals will be compensated based on the total cost of an episode 
of treatment, defined as the period beginning with admission of an LEJR patient to a 
participant hospital and ending 90 days after discharge. This time period is long enough 
to cover the complete period of recovery for most patients. Each episode includes all 
related items and services paid under Medicare fee-for-service (FFS) model, such as 
long-term care hospital services, inpatient rehabilitation facility services, and skilled 
nursing facility services (Cms.gov 2015).
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The CJR model is a retrospective bundled payment model whereby, prior to the 
start of each performance year, CMS provides participant hospitals with a target price 
that is the expected sum of expenditures of all parties. Within the performance year, CMS 
continues to pay all parties involved in the treatment of a patient according to an FFS 
model, whereby services are paid based on claims from providers. At the end of the 
performance year, the total expenditure will be adjusted according to the pre-specified 
target price by penalizing or rewarding the hospital. The target price will be adjusted 
-specific spending and regional 
spending for LEJR episodes (The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) 
2015).
Following completion of a CJR model performance year, participant hospitals that 
have actual episode spending below the target price and achieve a minimum acceptable 
quality score will receive a reward payment from Medicare for the difference between the 
target price and actual episode spending. Hospitals with LEJR episode spending that 
exceeds the target price will be financially responsible and must pay back the excess 
expenditure to Medicare. CMS expects the five-year program to yield $153 million in net 
savings (Dickson and Evans, 2015).
Even though a target price and associated reward or penalty are offered to 
hospitals, other providers involved in LEJR episodes of care throughout the performance 
year will be paid under existing Medicare FFS payment systems. The goal is to give 
hospitals a financial incentive to work with providers to coordinate care (HHS 2015).
Therefore, participant hospitals can enter into contracts with collaborating providers and 
suppliers who provide services to the patient during an episode of treatment. A 
participant hospital may share with other providers the reward payment received from 
Medicare as a result of reduced episode spending and the
The hospital may also share financial accountability (i.e., penalties) with other providers 
for increased episode spending (CMS, 2015). The CJR model thus shifts the risk of 
excess cost to hospitals, and incentivizes hospitals to arrange agreements with other 
providers to coordinate care. Accordingly, s
74
and losses from total cost of treatment with other providers in a way that motivates the
providers to reduce their cost while achieving the required quality of care. 
In this chapter, I am investigating three questions regarding the impact of a target 
price bundled payment model on care-
view, what is the best way to structure a gain-sharing agreement, whereby each hospital 
shares a portion of its reward or penalty with the provider(s)? To address this question, I 
study gain-sharing agreements,
of care, to coordinate care and reach the desired health quality and cost savings by the 
hospitals. I model a hospital and a provider that provide care for a specific procedure to 
patients. The hospital decides the portion of the reward or penalty to be shared with the 
provider. Then, the hospital and the provider decide on their respective cost-reduction 
efforts that would reduce the total cost of treatment. 
affect 
-reduction efforts and the total expenditure? To answer this question, I
investigate the impact of the gain-sharing agreements on the outcomes of interest when 
compared to some benchmark scenarios where there is no gain-sharing agreement 
between the hospital and the provider. 
Third, what are the implications of target price bundled payment models for the
payer? I provide practical guidance for the payer in anticipation of the percentage of 
savings and the savings sensitivity to the FFS payments and cost-reduction efficiency of 
the hospital and the provider.
My research yields several interesting results. First, I show that when there is a 
gain-sharing agreement between the hospital and the provider, the provider may be better 
off when the target price is low; this is because when the target price is low, the hospital 
needs the provider to exert effort to reduce the total treatment cost as it is more efficient 
for the provider to reduce the cost of its procedure. Furthermore, I show that despite the
fact that it is easier for a provider to reduce its costs, the hospital might exert more cost-
reduction effort than the provider because the hospital would rather exert some effort in-
house than share more of the reward with the provider.
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In the CJR model, CMS uses a discount factor, applied to the initial treatment 
cost, to determine the target price. However, I show that the payer can lower its total 
spending by imposing a target price on the hospital, even when the payer sets the target 
price equal to the current treatment cost of a patient under the FFS model, because the 
potential reward payment would incentivize the hospital and the provider to reduce their 
respective treatment costs. Further, I demonstrate that, under a target price bundled 
payment model, using a gain-sharing agreement is a win-win-win scenario for the payer, 
the hospital and the provider. At the same time, I also note that if the payer does not 
properly set the target price, it might not incentivize the hospital to arrange gain-sharing 
agreements with the provider, and to exert all the cost savings in-house instead.
I illustrate that a target price bundled payment model would be more effective in 
healthcare settings where there is greater asymmetry between the hospital and the 
-reduction efficiency, because in networks with higher asymmetry in the 
ability to reduce costs, there is an increased need to align the incentives of healthcare
providers to coordinate care. Finally, I show that changing the FFS payments to reach 
higher savings through target price bundled payment might negatively impact the quality 
of care.
This chapter is organized as follows. I first present the relevant literature in 
Section 4.2. Next, I introduce the status quo FFS model in Section 4.3. In Section 4.4, I
present the outcome of a bundled payment model where the hospital does not enter into a
gain-sharing agreement with the provider. I also introduce a benchmark centralized 
system where there is no money transfer between the hospital and the provider in section 
4.4. I analyze gain-sharing agreements in Section 4.5. To understand the implications of a 
target price bundled payment model to the payer, I perform numerical analysis on the 
equilibrium solutions in Section 4.6. Finally, concluding remarks and the study
managerial insights are found in Section 4.7.
4.2
This study is primarily related to the stream of literature that considers bundled payment 
models. For example, Gupta and Mehrotra (2015) study proposer selection 
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problem for its
coordinating mechanisms set by the payer to optimally incentivize and select providers to 
participate in the bundled payment program. However, I focus on hospitals that already 
participate in C
study the effects that FFS and bundled payment models have on patient selection and the 
treatment intensity decisions made by a provider. Similar to my model, they compare the 
outcomes of the FFS model with those of the bundled payment model. They find that the 
FFS model would result in overtreatment of patients. Guo et al. (2016) also compare the 
FFS model with a bundled payment model in a setting where patients are sensitive to wait 
times. They show that when the patient pool is sufficiently small, the bundled payment 
model is superior to the FFS model in all performance measures. Andritsos and Tang 
(2015) consider a co-managed situation where both the provider and the patient can exert 
effort to reduce the readmission rate, and conclude that bundled payment outperforms 
FFS by causing the provider and the patient to exert more effort to reduce readmission. 
These studies investigate incentive problems in healthcare systems in order to compare 
the outcome of different payment models, but they only consider a single provider that 
will receive the bundled payment. Contrastingly, in this study, I model bundled payments 
that cover the total treatment cost of patients who require procedures from a hospital and 
a provider. I investigate how the hospital can use gain-sharing agreements to coordinate 
care and optimally use the bundled payment to incentivize the provider.
My research closely relates to research on gain-sharing and risk-sharing 
agreements. For example, Barros (2011) studies the interactions between a 
pharmaceutical company and a payer with and without a risk-sharing agreement. He 
assumes patients respond successfully to the drug only with some probability, and the 
price for the drug is set by the drug manufacturer. He then shows that depending on when 
a risk-sharing agreement is negotiated (i.e., before or after the price has been set for the 
drug), the agreement may increase or decrease social welfare. Although I incorporate the 
probabilistic health outcome of a patient, in my study,
depends on both the hospital -reduction efforts. Zhang et al. 
(2011) study a price-volume agreement between a drug manufacturer and a payer in the 
presence of asymmetric information on demand. The authors consider a one-period 
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problem in which the unit sales price and the rebate rate are offered by the payer to the 
manufacturer. Mahjoub et al. (2013) study risk-sharing agreements between a drug 
manufacturer and a healthcare payer to manage uncertainties regarding the cost and 
effectiveness of drugs. They model a risk-sharing agreement in which a proportion of 
total sales is rebated to the payer. They investigate the conditions under which the 
manufacturer will make a profit. These studies analyze the coordination of a 
generated through direct sales. In my study, the hospital and the provider can achieve the 
required cost savings and quality of care only through collective effort.
There are also papers that study supply chain coordination through gain-sharing 
agreements. For example, Corbett and DeCroix (2001) study a supply chain with a 
supplier and a customer where the consumption of indirect materials can be saved by 
both the supplier and the customer. They compare a variety of contracts, including joint 
investment and shared-savings contracts, in which both parties would benefit from any 
reduction in consumption. They show that such shared-savings contracts can always lead 
to higher channel profits, but not necessarily to lower consumption. In Corbett and 
study, as in my study, the total cost depends on the collective effort of 
the providers to reduce the total cost. However, I study a scenario where both total cost 
and health quality depend on the collective effort of the hospital and the provider. 
Iida (2012) studies a single manufacturer that is exposed to probabilistic demand. 
The manufacturer decides on the quantity to produce, and the final product consists of 
components that are supplied from suppliers. The production cost of the final product 
depends on an
effort to reduce the production cost of each component. They develop effort-sharing 
agreements by which the parties share the benefits of cooperative cost reduction, and 
effort-compensation agreements that compensate the parties for the costs of their 
respective efforts. , where each party receives a 
reward based on its own cost savings, I analyze a system where the collective cost 
savings can be distributed among the parties involved. 
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Bernstein et al. (2015) study a decentralized assembly line consisting of a buyer 
and many independent suppliers. The components are assembled into a finished product, 
which is sold to the downstream market with a deterministic demand. Suppliers can 
invest in process-improvement activities to reduce the fixed production costs. The 
assembler establishes a knowledge-sharing network that is modeled as a cooperative 
game. Bernstein et al. (2015) identify and compare various cost allocation mechanisms 
that are feasible in the cooperative game, and show that the optimal system investment 
levels can be achieved only when the most efficient supplier receives the incremental 
benefits of the cost reduction achieved by other suppliers due to the knowledge transfer. 
Notably, these studies have only one target outcome that is, the production cost while
in my study, the hospital must achieve a minimum care quality threshold in order to be 
eligible for the reward payment.
4.3
First, I analyze a status quo system where there is no mechanism in place to coordinate 
care. I model a hospital and a provider that receive FFS payments from a payer. I assume 
that FFS payments cover a profit margin on the treatment cost incurred by each party. 
There is a pool of patients who will undergo a treatment that requires procedures 
from both the hospital and the provider. The hospital is responsible for procedure , and 
the provider is responsible for procedure . Let and be the cost of the 
procedures by each party. Without loss of generality, I normalize the number of treated 
patients in a performance year to one.
Both the hospital and the provider can reduce the cost of their respective 
procedures by exerting effort. Let , , denote the effort exerted by each party 
to decrease the cost of its respective procedure. Therefore, the total cost of treatment for 
each patient is a function of individual effort (i.e., ). I assume cost is 
linear and decreasing in effort, such that where represents 
the initial cost of the respective procedure for the hospital and the provider before any 
cost-reduction effort. Because each party undertakes different parts of the treatment, the 
cost function of the hospital is different from the cost function of the provider, and thus 
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the effect of cost-reduction effort is different as well. I assume that it is costlier for the 
hospital (rather than the provider) to reduce its costs (i.e., ) a reasonable 
assumption since the hospital pays for two large and inelastic components of the 
treatment (the implant and physician salaries), and must also cover significant fixed 
overhead costs, whereas the provider may reduce its cost by switching between available 
resources (e.g., using forced walking instead of continuous motion machines for rehab, or 
changing nursing hours per patient day). Thus, most of the savings can be reached 
through post-procedure healthcare services, consistent with Saxena (2016). Without loss 
of generality, I ), which 
implies . To incorporate diminishing returns, let be the cost of effort 
exerted by each party. As a result, under the FFS model,
written as follows:
:
The first part of the equation is the total profit from FFS payments, and the second part is 
the cost of the cost-redu
are decreasing in the cost-reduction effort because in the FFS model, there is no incentive 
to reduce the procedure cost. Accordingly, under the FFS model, no cost-reduction effort 
will be exerted (i.e., ), resulting in and 
with the total status quo treatment cost of .
4.4
To reduce the total spending, the payer can impose a bundled payment for total treatment 
cost to motivate the hospital and the provider to exert cost-reduction effort. I analyze a 
target price bundled payment model based on the CJR structure. In this scheme, for the 
treatment of each patient, there is an upper bound , representing the target price for the 
total cost of treatment, above which the hospital is penalized for the extra cost. The 
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hospital will also receive a reward payment when the treatment cost is below the target 
price, so I define total savings ( ) of the system as the difference between the target price 
and the total cost of treatment (i.e., ).
In the CJR model, the hospital is eligible for a reward payment only if all 
providers achieve a desired quality of care. The quality of care from the provider is 
independent of the quality of care from the hospital, and so the effect of cost-reduction 
effort on quality of care is separately evaluated, and the hospital will receive the reward 
payment only if the patient has received adequate care ( ) from both the hospital and the 
provider (Figure 4.1). Each party may fail to provide the required quality of care. For 
example, in the CJR model, the major quality measures are based on patient-reported 
outcomes (PROs) and the Hospital Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and 
Systems (HCAHPS) survey scores (Terry, 2016). While these scores are based on 
customer satisfaction, the quality of care provided by each provider in the treatment of a 
affects these scores. Thus, I assume that the required quality of care is 
uncertain, and can be achieved with some probability. I further assume that quality 
decreases in line with an increasing effort to reduce costs (the lower the cost, the lower 
the quality of care). I assume a linear effort-dependent function such that .
To ensure well-defined probabilities, I bound the cost-reduction effort such that 
.
Figure 4.1: Payment scheme depending on performance
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4.4.1 Centralized system (Strategy C)
As a benchmark scenario for a target price bundled payment model, I analyze a 
centralized system in which the hospital (central planner) provides all the procedures and 
care required for the treatment of a patient during an episode of treatment (single 
s:
The first term is the central pl
treatment is lower than the target price . The third term occurs when 
the total cost of treatment is higher than the target price, and thus the central planner is 
penalized regardless of the quality of care (Figure 4.1). The fourth and fifth terms are the 
cost of the cost-reduction effort that the central planner has exerted for each procedure.
-reduction 
effort for the two procedures required to treat a patient.
s.t.       
Because the cost savings are deterministic, the equivalent problem for the central 
planner is to maximize its expected profit by choosing from the following two strategies.
1) Reward strategy:
s.t.
82
2) Penalty strategy:
s.t.
Proposition 4.1 illustrates the optimal outcome and effort level of the central 
planner. Thresholds are defined in Appendix-C. The 
parameter is also defined in Appendix-C as the critical point of a differentiable 
function. 
Proposition 4.1: The central planner will
1) Receive reward payment if and only if  . In this case,
i. if , then and
ii. if , then and
iii. if , then and
2) Have zero savings if and only if  . In this case,
and
3) Be penalized if and only if . In this case,
and
Proposition 4.1 is illustrated in Figure 4.2.
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Figure 4.2: Optimal solution in the centralized system when
Proposition 4.1 shows how the central planner can exert cost-reduction effort to 
achieve cost savings. The result is intuitive, in that the central planner should exert more 
effort through the provider because the provider can reduce the cost of its procedure with 
less effort. This intuition holds, regardless of the target price ,
for 
-reduction efforts are 
weakly decreasing as the target price increases ( ); this is because (1) exerting cost-
reduction effort decreases the FFS payments, and (2) the higher the target price, the easier 
to it is to earn the reward payment. When the target price is small (i.e., ), the central 
planner cannot achieve cost savings (i.e., ) and will be penalized. In this region, 
while the central planner exerts the maximum effort level through the provider, it limits 
the cost-reduction effort of the hospital as the reduction in the penalty by the hospital does 
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not compensate for the required investment. Figure 4.2 is illustrative, and the shape and 
the insights are the same for other parameterizations. 
Proposition 4.2 shows how the central plann
a target price is different from the total profit in the status quo decentralized system with 
simple FFS payment model. is formally defined in Appendix-C.
Proposition 4.2: 
quo FFS model if the payer sets a target price that is higher than a threshold . (i.e., 
)
As illustrated in Figure 4.3, the hospital and the provider would prefer a centralized 
system with the target price bundled payment model to the status quo FFS model only if 
the payer sets a target price that is higher than the threshold. Thus, in a centralized 
system, is the absolute lower bound to the target price that the payer can set.
Figure 4.3: Profit and savings of the centralized system when
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4.4.2 Decentralized system (Strategy D)
In this scenario, I assume that both the hospital and the provider will be compensated 
based on the FFS model but the payer will impose a target price on the hospital based on 
the total system cost. Thus, the hospital will be rewarded or penalized depending on the 
total cost of treatment compared to the target price. Because the provider will only be 
compensated according to the FFS model, the provider does not exert any cost-reduction 
effort (i.e., ), resulting in .
:
treatment. The fourth term is the cost of the cost-reduction effort.
Proposition 4.3 illustrates the optimal outcome and effort level of the hospital in a 
decentralized system. Thresholds are defined in Appendix-C.
Proposition 4.3: The hospital will
1) Receive reward payment if and only if  . In this case,
i. if , then and
ii. if  , then and
2) Have zero savings if and only if  . In this case,
and
3) Be penalized if and only if . In this case,
and
Proposition 4.3 is illustrated in Figure 4.4.
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Figure 4.4: Optimal solution in the decentralized system when 
It is obvious that the savings under the centralized system are always weakly 
higher than the savings under the decentralized system because in the decentralized 
system, where the hospital receives (pays) all the reward (penalty) payments, the provider 
will not exert any cost-reduction effort. Figure 4.5 illustrates the system savings in the 
decentralized system using the same scale as in Figure 4.3.
Proposition 4.4: 
in the status quo FFS model if the payer sets a target price that is higher than a threshold 
(i.e., s.t. ). The provider is not affected when the 
target price is only imposed on the hospital (i.e., ).
Proposition 4.4 shows that in a decentralized system with no gain-sharing 
agreement, the hospital and the provider would participate in a target price bundled 
payment model only if the payer sets a target price that is higher than the threshold. 
Moreover, this lower bound is always higher than the lower bound for target price in the 
centralized system (i.e., ).
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Figure 4.5: Profits and savings of the decentralized system when 
4.5
In this section, I investigate gain-sharing agreements to examine (1) how the hospital can 
incentivize the provider to exert cost-reduction effort, and (2) whether both parties can be 
better off under these agreements. To achieve the desired quality of care and the target 
price, the hospital can offer the provider a gain-sharing agreement where the hospital 
shares a portion of the reward and a portion of the penalty with the provider, and 
keep portion of the reward and of the penalty for itself where 
and ows:
In this model, if the patient receives the required quality of care (i.e. 
), then the hospital will keep of the reward. Similarly, if there is a 
penalty, the provider must pay e
written as follows:
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I assume that the cost functions are public information, and thus the provider 
knows the cost incurred by the hospital. Because it is easier for the provider to change the 
cost of its procedure by switching between its resources, the provider can adjust its cost-
reduction effort, given the treatment cost at the hospital. Therefore, I assume that the 
provider decides on its cost- -reduction 
effort. Figure 4.6 illustrates the sequence of events.
Figure 4.6: Sequence of events
At the first stage of the game, the hospital decides on the gain-sharing agreement 
to maximize its expected payoff. I assume that the provider accepts the contract 
offered by the hospital (I do not impose a participation constraint), because I am
interested in the absolute lower bound on the target price (set by the payer) that makes 
both the hospital and the provider participate in the target price bundled payment model. 
For these reasons, the focus of the results will be on the non-binding case where the 
provider is better off when accepting these agreements. Accordingly
is as follows:
s.t.       
and 
Next, the provider, knowing the contract terms, maximizes its expected payoff by 
investing in cost-reduction effort:
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s.t.       
I solve the problem using backward induction. The full details on the derivation of the 
equilibrium solution are shown in Appendix-C. Proposition 4.5 illustrates the optimal 
outcome and effort level of the decentralized system with gain-sharing agreement. 
Thresholds and expressions , and are 
defined in Appendix-C. Proposition 4.5 is illustrated in Figure 4.7.
Proposition 4.5: The hospital and the provider will
1) Receive reward payment if and only if  . In this case,
i. if , then 
ii. if , then 
iii. if , then 
2) Have zero savings if and only if  . In this case,
3) Be penalized if and only if , where
Figure 4.7: Optimal solution in the decentralized system with gain-sharing 
agreement when 
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When the target price is small (i.e., ), the hospital and the provider cannot
achieve cost savings and will be penalized. In this case, the hospital will not exert any 
cost-reduction effort and will set to minimize its loss. However, when rewards 
are possible (dark shaded region), the hospital may exert effort to reduce the total 
treatment cost. In this case, the hospital will get the reward and may share it with the 
provider ( . The portion of the reward that the hospital shares with the provider 
decreases as the target price increases because when the target price is high, it is easier to 
be eligible for reward payment; thus, even if the provider can reduce its cost more 
efficiently, the hospital does not need to incentivize the provider to exert as much cost-
reduction effort. 
Corollary 4.1: In the decentralized system with gain-sharing agreements,
1) The hospital may exert more cost-reduction effort as the target price increases 
2) The hospital may exert more cost-reduction effort than the provider
Because the provider can reduce its cost more efficiently, intuition may suggest 
that most of the savings should be generated through the provider (as is the case in 
Section 4.4.1., Centralized system ) when the hospital uses gain-sharing agreements. 
However, Corollary 4.1 shows that this is not always the case when using a gain-sharing 
agreement. In fact, when the target price is high, in order to have higher probability of 
qualifying for reward payment, the hospital needs the provider to reach the required 
quality of care instead of exerting cost-reduction effort. Therefore, to make it unattractive 
for the provider to exert cost-
share from the reward. To compensate for the increased cost (i.e., because of decreased 
effort by the provider), the hospital will increase its own cost-reduction effort. 
Furthermore, when the target price is too high (i.e., ),
not compensate for the cost of the gain-sharing agreement for the hospital, and thus the
hospital would rather not use a gain-sharing agreement ( ) and instead switch to 
Strategy D and exert all the cost-reduction effort in-house. This result highlights the fact 
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that if the payer does not set the target price properly, the target price bundled payment 
strategy would not incentivize the hospital to arrange gain-sharing agreements with 
providers to coordinate care and reduce the treatment cost.
Corollary 4.2:
One might expect that both the provider and the hospital would be better off as 
the target price increases. Yet, as illustrated in Figure 4.8, this intuition may not hold 
when the parties are in the reward zone (dark shaded region) because when the target 
price is high, the hospital will exert most of the cost savings in-house to avoid sharing the
reward with the provider (Corollary 4.1). Hence, the provider may be better off when the 
target price is low, because in this case, the hospital needs the provider to exert effort to 
reduce total cost of treatment and thus increase savings. 
Figure 4.8: Profits and savings of the decentralized system with gain-sharing 
agreement when 
Proposition 4.6: In the decentralized system with gain-sharing agreement, both the 
hospit s are higher than their respective profit in the status 
quo FFS model if the payer sets a target price that is higher than a threshold (i.e., 
s.t ).
Proposition 4.6 shows the absolute lower bound to the target price that the payer 
can set in a decentralized system with gain-sharing agreements such that both the hospital 
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and the provider are better off compared to the status quo FFS model. In the decentralized 
system, this threshold is always smaller when the hospital uses gain-sharing agreements 
as opposed to bearing all the reward/penalty (i.e., ).
4.6
In the previous sections, I presented the analytical solution for the equilibrium of each 
strategy and found the absolute lower bound for the target price that the payer can set in a 
target price bundled payment model. In this section, I perform numerical analysis on the 
equilibrium solutions to better understand the implications of the target price bundled 
payment model to the payer. I
cost-reduction efficiency and the FFS profit margin (i.e., and
minimize its total spending, which can be defined as follows:
The first term is the FFS payments plus the profit margin that the hospital and the 
provider receive on their respective treatment cost. The second and third terms are any 
potential reward or penalty. Figure 4.9 illustrates the total spending in each strategy.
Figure 4.9: Total spending when 
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Remark 4.1: The payer can reduce total spending relative to FFS, regardless of the 
, by imposing a target price that is 
equal to the total cost in the FFS model (i.e., ).
To determine the target price for the CJR model, CMS uses a discount factor on 
the total cost of treatment under FFS (i.e., it sets a lower target price to achieve cost 
savings). However, my numerical analysis shows that the lower bounds for the target 
price are always smaller than the total cost of treatment under FFS (i.e., 
). Thus, the payer can lower its total spending, using a target price bundled payment 
strategy, even when the payer sets a target price that is equal to the current cost of 
treatment (i.e., ). Nevertheless, in a decentralized system, if the payer knows that 
there will be a gain-sharing agreement between the hospital and the provider, the payer 
can minimize the total spending by setting the target price ; otherwise, the payer 
can only reduce the target price to .
Remark 4.2: In a decentralized system, both the hospital and the provider prefer to use 
gain-sharing agreements (i.e., ) if 
.
Remark 4.2 shows that when the payer sets an acceptable target price (i.e., 
), both the hospital and the provider would rather sign a gain-sharing agreement than
not sign an agreement. Following Corollary 4.1, the upper bound on the target price is 
-sharing 
agreement for the hospital. Thus, I provide a range for the target price such that, by 
setting a target price in this range, the payer can incentivize the hospital and the provider 
to enter into gain-sharing agreements. 
In addition, my numerical experiments show that th
always lower when the hospital signs gain-sharing agreements with the provider unless 
(Proposition 4.5) such that the hospital does not sign a gain-sharing agreement 
even when it has the option to do so. Hence, in a target price bundled payment model, 
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signing a gain- -win- t offers
higher profit for the hospital and the provider, and lower spending for the payer. 
To understand the impact of the provid -reduction efficiency ( ) and the 
FFS profit margin ( ) on the total spending, I show the ratio for different parameter 
settings in Figure 4.10.
Remark 4.3: -
spending compared to the FFS profit margin.
Figure 4.10: Ratio of for different values of , , and 
Remark 4.3 implies that the payer might achieve greater savings by applying a 
target price bundled payment model in settings where the healthcare providers have 
higher asymmetry in cost-reduction efficiency; this is because higher asymmetry in the 
ability to reduce cost increases the need to align the incentives of all parties.
Given a cost-reduction efficiency, the payer can always increase the savings by 
reducing the profit margin, which will incentivize the participants to reduce the total 
treatment cost to be eligible for a reward payment. However, reducing the total spending 
might negatively impact the quality of care. To evaluate the potential impact of the 
quality of care to the payer, I define the cost per quality ratio . Therefore, 
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as the target price bundled payment model with gain-sharing agreements reduces the total 
spending ( ) compared to the FFS spending ( ), it will also reduce the probability of 
achieving the desired quality score (i.e., ), which reduces the cost per 
quality ratio. Note that in the status quo FFS model, the desired quality score is reached 
with the probability equal to one. In Figure 4.11 I evaluate the impact of and the on
the cost per quality ratio.
Figure 4.11: Ratio of for different values of , , and 
Figure 4.11 shows that changing the FFS profit margin ( ) can have an important 
-off for the payer when reducing : while 
it will incentivize the hospital and the provider to reduce the total treatment cost, it will 
also negatively impact the quality of care.
4.7
4.7.1 Separate cost and quality
In the CJR model the CMS aims to coordinate the care and reduce the total spending by 
imposing a target price bundled payment model on the hospital. However, imposing a 
separate cost and quality measure for each involved party might have a higher potential 
impact on the overall outcome. It is obvious that in such a setting hospital and the 
provider would not enter into gain-sharing agreements as they do not have any common 
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element in their profit functions. Thus,
follows.
Note that, both parties are evaluated based on their corresponding cost and quality. 
Similarly, the expected profit can be written as follows.
In other to have comparable results with the main model I assume that 
. Figure 4.12 illustrates the total spending in each strategy.
Figure 4.12: Total spending when 
Figure 4.12 shows that imposing a separate target price on the hospital and the 
provider would be more effective in reducing the total spending when compared to a 
single target price imposed to the hospital. Moreover, this policy would even have a total 
spending lower than a centralized system in which the desired quality of care is evaluated 
separately each party is responsible for their own cost and quality that is independent of 
the outcome of the other care provider; however, when the quality of care measured 
that a patient received elsewhere.
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4.7.2 Interdependency in cost functions
In the previous sections I assume that the cost functions of the hospital and the provider 
are independent. However, when hospital decreases its treatment cost the quality of care 
may also decrease. As a result, the health condition of a patient that arrives at the 
provider depends on the services that she received at the hospital. Therefore, cost-
reduction efforts at the hospital may negatively impact the treatment cost at the provider. 
ost-reduction effort such that 
where is the degree of dependency. The analysis in the previous 
sections are for the special case where . In this section, I analyze the impact of on
the gain sharing agreements and its implications for the payer.
-reduction effort on the 
from exerting in-house cost-reduction effort. Thus, depending on the degree of 
dependency ( ) the hospital would use the gain-sharing agreements for a wider set of 
-reduction efforts to reduce total treatment cost. 
Figure 4.13 illustrates the optimal solution in a decentralized system with gain-sharing 
agreements when .
Figure 4.13: Optimal solution in decentralized system with gain-sharing agreement 
when
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Figure 4.13 shows that does not have any impact on the penalty and zero 
savings regions as in those regions hospital does not benefit from any cost-reduction 
effort even when . However, when compared to Figure 4.7, it is clear how the 
-
sharing agreements. 
To understand the impact of the degree of dependency in the cost functions on the 
for different values of in Figure 4.14.
Figure 4.14: Ratio of for different values of 
As shown in Figure 4.14 the degree of dependency , does not have any impact 
on the outcome when the optimal in-house cost-reduction effort for the hospital is zero 
(small and large target price). However, when the target price is intermediate and the 
hospital requires to have some in-house cost savings, a system with lower is always 
preferred by all parties.
4.8
In this chapter, I examine the structure of gain-sharing agreements between a hospital and 
s condition. Following the general framework of 
the CJR payment model introduced by CMS, I investigate the effect of gain-sharing 
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agreements on the performance of a target price bundled payment model where the 
hospital is responsible for meeting a threshold on the total treatment cost. Both the 
hospital and the provider can exert cost-reduction effort to reduce their respective cost of 
treatment, which will, in turn, negatively impact the quality of care.     
My research provides practical guidance for the payer regarding the use of such 
target price bundled payment models to coordinate care. I show that using gain-sharing 
-win- under the target price bundled 
payment model. However, the choice of the target price is particularly important to 
incentivize the hospital to enter into a gain-sharing agreement with the provider. The 
target price should be low enough such that, to be eligible for reward payment, the 
hospital would need the provider to reduce its cost. I also provide evidence that a target 
price bundled payment model can be more effective in healthcare settings where the care 
providers have asymmetric capabilities.  
My study is based on a stylized mathematical model with several limiting 
assumptions, and extending some of these assumptions can lead to interesting future 
work. I assume that patients receive the required care from a hospital and a single 
provider; yet, as is the case in joint and hip replacement procedures, there might be 
multiple p
research might be to examine care-coordination in multi-agent pay-for-performance 
agreements. I also assume that the cost functions are public information and the provider 
can observ -reduction effort. A more robust modeling approach would 
be to model this problem as a multi-agent system with information asymmetry, where 
.
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Chapter 5
5
In this thesis, I examine incentive problems in different environments, such as a 
decentralized supply chain setting in a manufacturing industry and a fragmented 
healthcare system. In the supply chain setting, I extend the literature by examining the
impact of capacity on the optimal channel structure when a contract manufacturer can 
compete in both the component and final-product markets. I use a game theoretical 
under different capacity 
levels and market conditions.
In the healthcare setting, I examine optimal design of contracts to better 
incentivize parties with conflicting interests in order to achieve an improved outcome in 
the delivery of modern healthcare services. In Chapter 3, I model the interaction between 
a payer and a provider when an optional diagnostic test can be used to predict the benefits 
of an advanced treatment option. I design performance-based contracts to align the 
incentives of the payer and the provider to achieve optimal use of the optional diagnostic 
test. I introduce a new payment scheme in which the reward payments are tied to the 
treatment decision of the provider, as well as the health outcome of patients. Further, I 
model the imperfect information flow in fragmented healthcare settings where the 
about whether or not the optimal course of action is used (moral hazard).
In Chapter 4, I examine the incentives of a hospital and a provider to reduce their 
respective procedure costs when providing care for a patient who requires treatment from 
both the hospital and the provider. This problem is particularly challenging, as the cost-
reduction efforts of the hospital and the provider impact both the procedure cost and 
quality of care. I investigate the effects of different payment structures such as FFS, 
bundled payment, and bundled payment with gain-sharing model on the cost-reduction 
efforts and profits of the hospital and the provider. I provide guidance, for the payer, 
regarding the impact of these models on the health outcome of patients and the total 
spending.
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5.1
The results of my study in Chapter 2 provide strategic insights for OBMs facing 
competition from their supplier with limited capacity. I show that sharing capacity 
through supply chain partnership may result in a more profitable industry, rather than a 
price war. Such insight would increase the desirability of cooperating with competitors 
when there is a potential to achieve economies of scale through increased capacity levels.
I demonstrate that the OBM only dual-sources its component demand when competition 
in the final-
capacity while outsourcing the rest of the component demand to a third-party supplier. I 
provide evidence for different resource allocation strategies of a CCM, and present an 
explanation for both prioritizing capacity to a the
own product output to shift profits to component sales to a competitor.
Chapter 3 provides evidence for the necessity of developing alternative payment 
models as the availability of personalized medicine and the number of treatment options 
increases. Furthermore, I highlight the importance of information flow in the fragmented 
systems by showing that in a system with information asymmetry, it is never optimal to 
use a diagnostic test for patients from all risk groups, even when the test can be available 
for free. By showing how an increase in reputational concerns and altruistic behavior of a 
provider may increase or decrease social welfare, I provide further support for the 
inconsistent evidence regarding the impact of malpractice pressure on healthcare systems. 
Finally, my findings suggest that it is not always optimal to make a diagnostic test 
compulsory, even if it is recommended by the guidelines.
Chapter 4 provides guidelines for policymakers regarding the use of target price
bundled payment models to coordinate care in fragmented healthcare systems. I show 
that such payment models can be more effective in healthcare settings where there is 
more asymmetry between the cost efficiency of the parties involved in the treatment of 
patients. In addition, I show that the decision on the target price is essential in 
incentivizing the hospital to arrange gain-sharing agreements because when the target 
price is low enough, the hospital needs the provider to exert effort to reduce the total 
treatment cost (as it is more efficient for the provider to reduce the cost of its procedure). 
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However, if the target price is not set properly, despite the fact that it is easier for a 
provider to reduce its cost, the hospital might exert more cost-reduction effort than the 
provider because the hospital would rather exert some effort in-house than share more of 
the reward with the provider.
While each essay focuses on different settings they share a common insight 
regarding the fragmented systems with conflicting interests. In all essays, I show that the 
inefficiency caused by the decentralization may cause firms not to use some resources 
even if they are efficient or available for free. In the first essay, the CCM might not 
utilize free capacity. In the second essay, the test should not be used for patients from all 
risk groups. In the third essay, the hospital may exert costly effort instead of benefiting 
f -reduction efficiency.
5.2
The studies in this thesis are based on a stylized mathematical models with several 
limiting assumptions. Therefore, generalization of the underlying problems would be a 
fruitful avenue for future research on incentive problems of parties with potential conflict 
of interest in decentralized systems. For example, in a capacitated supply chain setting, 
incorporating demand uncertainty in a supply chain with multiple strategic contract 
manufacturers, each with the option of producing their own brand products can lead to 
interesting future work.
In most circumstances patients have multiple options when deciding on which 
healthcare provider to visit. Thus, considering the impact of competition among providers 
reputational concerns on his test ordering behavior. Furthermore, most of the procedures 
in fragmented health care systems, as in joint and hip replacement procedures, require 
patients to receive treatment from multiple providers. Therefore, studying multi-agent 
pay-for-performance agreements would be an interesting generalization to the care-
coordination problem studied in this thesis.
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Appendix-A
In this section I derive the equilibrium solution for the 3-stage game defined in Section
2.3. From equation (2.1): ; . I
only consider the region where such that the two products are 
competing. 
1 - Stage 3 of the game
), so FOC gives: 
. For firm C, using KKT conditions to 
consider the capacity constraint, I have two optimal pricing strategy: 1) Non-binding 
capacity constraint: ; 2) Binding capacity constraint: 
. I solve for the optimal prices under each capacity 
condition: Case 1) Non-binding capacity constraint:
; For case 1, I need
. Case 2) Binding capacity constraint:
.
2 - Stage 2 of the game
Case 1) ) which implies that 
optimal allocation ratio 
non-binding the extreme point is either zero or one (i.e., ). For firm O to set a 
non-zero ratio (i.e., ), the resulting profit should be higher than its profit when 
(i.e., 
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), such that 
firm O will outsource all its component demand to firm C. 
Case 2) Firm there is 
only one root to the FOC condition ( ) which is a minimizer ( 
). However, depending on the values of the parameters, this 
critical point may not be in the feasible region ( ). Though, since there is only 
one stationary point, I can claim that the profit function is maximized at an extreme point: 
1) if the stationary point is in the feasible region, or 2) if the stationary point is not in the 
feasible region and the profit function is a decreasing/increasing function of in the 
feasible region. Therefore, for firm O to set a non-zero ratio the resulting profit should be 
higher than the profit when (i.e., 
. In 
the binding capacity case, in order to have non-
capacity has to be between . Because is always and extreme point 
multi-sourcing can only happen when firm C does not have enough capacity to fulfill 
nd in which case firm O is the monopoly in the final-product 
market and firm C acts as the supplier only. Consequently, I separate the game into three 
competing strategies: 1) , Coopetition (Superscript C); 2) , Competition 
(Superscript T); and 3) , Supplier only (Superscript S). 
I can express the optimal prices and capacity conditions for each strategy as follows. The 
optimal prices for the coopetition strategy (C) are: Case 1)
iff  ; Case 2)
iff . The optimal 
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prices for the competition strategy (T) are: Case 1)
iff ; Case 2) 
iff
. The limits on 
is competitive in the component market that is firm O would get a non-negative profit if 
city, firm C 
will have the supplier only role. In this case, firm O is the monopoly in the final product 
market that is only feasible when with
. Firm
) and if necessary firm O multi-sources the rest of its 
component demand from firm T. 
3 - Stage 1 of the game
In the equilibrium, firm C maximizes its profit function by choosing its wholesale price 
for each strategy that it acts as the
compatibility and participation constraints. The incentive compatibility constraint ensures 
participation constraint makes sure that firm O gets at least as much as its outside option 
strategy T. Finally, knowing the best outcome of each strategy, firm C chooses the 
equilibrium strategy with its wholesale price for each capacity , competition level ,
.
Knowing the optimal set of prices in each strategy, fi
coopetition scenario with binding capacity constraint pricing strategy (case 2, represented 
by superscript ) is: 
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(IR)
(IR)
(IC)
Superscript is used to represent nonbinding capacity case (case 1). I solve the problem 
using KKT conditions. Note that, the two IR constraints are exclusive and thus I solve
two similar optimization problems for each. 
the maximum wholesale price before firm O outsources to firm T ( . The optimal 
wholesale price for collectively exhaustive and individually exclusive regions in case 2 of 
coopetition scenario are:
iff
;
iff
;
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iff
;
iff
;
-binding case (case 1) of coopetition scenario is: 
(IR)
(IR)
(IC)
KKT conditions would result in collectively exhaustive and individually exclusive 
regions with optimal wholesale prices as follows. 
iff ;
iff .
Lemma A1: The maximum acceptable wholesale price by firm O such that it is better off 
to outsource to firm C weakly decreases in capacity of firm C (i.e., .
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Proof of Lemma 2.1, Propositions 2.1, and Proposition 2.4: The Equilibrium 
Solution
Despite the fact that each case (binding and non-binding) has wholesale prices for 
constraint. For example, if firm C prefers binding capacity case it has to make sure that 
). Moreover, firm C can choose to set wholesale price high enough so to 
deter firm O from outsourcing to firm C (violating IR constraints). Firm C would set high 
wholesale prices when firm Cs profit from competition strategy is more than its profit 
from coopetition strategy (i.e., ). Replacing the optimal pricing and wholesale 
price of each region I
optimal outsourcing strategies is as follows. 
Competition Strategy: (outsource to firm T)
Coopetition Strategy: (outsource to firm C)
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Figure 2.2 illustrates the four-region strategies that are outlined above at where 
is the maximum wholesale price of firm T in Region II. For expositional 
convenience define capacity thresholds that separate the four regions:
Next, I
strategy is an increasing function in wholesale price (i.e., ); therefore, firm C 
would choose a wholesale price that is incentive compatible with firm O.
(IR)
(IR)
(IC)
(IC)
In the above maximization problem the two IC (IR) constraints are exclusive and do not 
appear together. First, I find the minimum wholesale price that is required for firm C to 
be better off being supplier only compared to its profit in the four-region strategies 
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outlined above. Then, I find the wholesale price range, for which IR and IC constraints 
are satisfied while keeping wholesale price higher than the minimum required for firm C
profit in the supplier only strategy will force either the IC or IR constraint to bind. 
Therefore, I find the wholesale price that binds each constraint. Then, whichever 
wholesale price that is smaller would be the maximum wholesale price that firm C can 
charge in the supplier only strategy for its corresponding region depending on
. If this maximum acceptable wholesale price is larger than the minimum 
required wholesale price for firm C to prefer the supplier only strategy, firm C would 
apply the maximum acceptable wholesale price and thus incentivize firm O to buyout 
I show the analysis 
only for the Region IV where . In this region the optimal strategy, without 
consideration of supplier only strategy, is coopetition strategy with non-binding capacity 
constraint. Therefore, firm C, in order to prefer the supplier only strategy, should have 
; this would result in a minimum 
required wholesale price of for firm C to prefer the supplier only 
strategy to coopetition strategy. Because in this region (i.e., 
) capacity is always larger than 
I only need to consider (IR). Moreover, with a minimum wholesale 
price of the capacity in this region is always larger than 
which leads us to only consider (IC). As mentioned, I only need 
to consider the wholesale prices that make the IC and IR constraint binding.
;
(I only consider 
the positive root).
114
In the sequential equilibrium the supplier only strategy is optimal if and only if 
; That is 
The analysis for the rest of the regions is omitted due to redundancy. Figure 2.5 shows
the final equilibrium when product substitutability is . Regions V and VI are 
the supplier only strategy region. From the derivation of the above equilibrium I find that 
the supplier only strategy is only optimal in the sequential equilibrium if and only if 
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. Otherwise, the four-region 
equilibrium presented above is the equilibrium solution of the game. Consequently, I
claim that the four-region equilibrium conditions presented above is the unique 
equilibrium of this sequential game when and Proposition 2.1 is a different 
representation of the above-mentioned equilibrium regions. Table A.1 presents the 
optimal prices, demands and profits of the firms in the four-region equilibrium when 
.
Proof of Proposition 2.2: Sensitivity Analysis
a. From Table A.1 I can replace the corresponding demands: 
. This inequality is always true as 
long as , which is always larger than 
change around , the second expression (i.e., 
) is the immediate result of the previous one.
b. This result is immediate from Table A.1 as long as which is always larger 
than .
c. Profit function of firm C in Regions I and III is a concave function in its capacity 
where and are the maximizers of its profit in these regions respectively. These 
maximum points are situated within the regions (e.g., ). Therefore, firm 
;
. Moreover, I show that the absolute value of the slope in Region III is larger than that 
of Region I: 
.
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Proof of Proposition 2.3: Sensitivity Analysis
This proposition is an immediate result of Table A.1.
Derivation of equilibrium when there is no competition in component market
In this section I investigate the equilibrium conditions of the scenario presented in 
Section 2.5 where firm C is the proprietary component manufacturer. I use the same logic 
as the main model to derive the equilibrium. The optimal prices are: Case 1)
if and only if 
(Condition 1); Case 2) .
Knowing the best response optimal prices firm C will choose the wholesale price: Case 
1) ) and has a maximum (
) at ; Case 2) ( ) and 
has a maximum ( ) at  . Note that, in binding case firm 
maintaining positive prices and profits (i.e,, ).
Similar to the main model, there is an overlap between the capacity conditions. Since 
firm C is the first mover, considering the incentive compatibility conditions of firm O, it 
decides which of the optimal wholesale prices to choose when capacity is in the 
overlapping region.
A)
; B)
.
Before claiming the above regions to be the equilibrium of the game I also consider a 
case where firm C chooses to be a monopoly. In this scenario, firm C faces a capacity 
constraint (i.e., ) and only decides on its market price. Solving for the optimal 
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price considering the price and demand non-negativity, I have: 
.
Comparing with the cooperation scenario, I show that there are some cases that firm C 
prefers to be monopoly in the final product market and thus results in four different 
regions of equilibrium depending on f :
1.
2.
3.
4.
Finally, I consider a case where firm C chooses to be supplier only. In this case, firm C 
chooses the wholesale price and only after that firm O will decide on the market price 
). So, FOC gives: 
. Then, firm C chooses its optimal wholesale price. Having a strictly concave 
profit function ( ):
dominated by its profit in the monopoly or coopetition scenarios presented in the four-
region equilibrium above. Consequently, I claim that the four-region equilibrium is the 
unique equilibrium of this sequential game. Table A.2 presents the optimal prices, 
demands and profits of the firms in each region of the equilibrium.
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Proof of Proposition 2.5: Value of competition
From Table A.1 and A.2 I can find for any given capacity , product 
substitutability (e.g.,
). There are in total 11 
different values of competition outcomes for firm O depending on capacity level and 
product substitutability when . Knowing the functions I can derive 
the results in Proposition 2.5. The results for firm C can be driven in the same way. 
Table A.1: Equilibrium profits, prices, and demands of the firms when 
Equilibrium 
Region Firm C Firm O
I)
Competition 
Binding
II)
Competition
Non-Binding
III)
Coopetition
Binding
IV)
Coopetition
Non-Binding
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Table A.2: Equilibrium profits, prices, and demands of the firms when there is no 
competition in the component market
Equilibrium 
Region Firm C Firm O
1)
2)
3)
4)
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Appendix-B
Proof of Lemma 3.1: Applying the first-order condition (FOC) to the
objective function gives , which is independent of patient risk
distribution . This function is concave at if and only if
; otherwise, 
patients (i.e., ). follows from the proof of the Proposition 3.
Proof of Lemma 3.2: Since , I focus on 
where .
Proof of Proposition 3.1: Applying the extended revelation principle to program (3.5), I
restrict my attention to direct mechanisms where the contracts are a pair of optimal 
treatment choices for the two patient types (i.e., and ). Because 
treating high-risk patients has relatively higher risk, the payer needs higher-valued 
contract payment terms to ensure participation ( ) compared to 
the case where patients are low-risk. Thus, I omit the constraint and check if it holds 
after designing optimal contracts. Furthermore, the provider has incentive to misrepresent 
low-risk patients, so always holds. I prove this conjecture by showing that 
given the payment contracts.  Thus, omitting and in the equilibrium and
has to bind for all treatment choices. I
problem for the nine treatment choices given in Table A.3. Note that the provider may 
choose to change the treatment choice when misrepresenting a patient (c.f. and ).
Following Lemma 3.1 I know that the optimal treatment threshold decision of the 
provider does not depend on the patient risk (i.e., ) but does depend on 
payment terms. Therefore, if the provider misrepresents his patient and chooses a contract 
that is designed for other patient type, then the optimal treatment threshold will also 
change for the patient because of the change in contract terms. For example, when 
treatment option 2 is selected for both patient types (i.e., 
problem is:
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for other treatment choices can be presented similarly. When the test is 
ordered, the payer so
the optimal treatment threshold might be an interior point or an extreme point. Note that 
if FOC gives a minimum ( ) then the underlying treatment choice will be 
dominated by other treatment choices that consider the extreme points (i.e., or
). Thus, if the test is ordered . From 
Lemma 3.1 the payer knows the best response function of the provider for optimal 
treatment threshold of each patient type. Therefore, the payer would choose payment 
terms such tha ) results in payer
optimal treatment threshold.
From , and , I get 
and . Replacing the payment terms 
ment threshold I get for all treatment choices with  
. Thus, regardless of the slack variables (e.g., ), the provider would choose the 
same treatment threshold for both patient types. The payer would choose the remaining 
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two terms to maximize its value function. Replacing payment terms into payer
function, I show that when the test is used for both patient types (i.e., ),
while the value function is independent of changes in (i.e., ), it is always 
decreasing in (i.e., ); therefore, . I have:
,
, and 
, where 
and 
. It can be shown that  and when , ,
and .
Payment terms for the other treatment choices are derived using a similar approach. Next,
I check if and hold for all nine treatment choices. I show that when the provider 
treats high-risk patients (i.e., ) then .  Otherwise,
123
. Using 
integration by parts I have: 
. This can be replicated for the risk distribution of low-risk patients, so I get 
. because and 
because . Similar logic can be used to show .
To find the equilibrium treatment decisions, I examine the conditions for 
such that the payer would skip the test. Proposition 3.1
illustrates the equilibrium solution resulted from the comparison of the outcomes from all 
treatment choices.
Proof of Corollary 3.1: Cases 1, 2, and 3 correspond to treatment choices with ,
where . Case 4 and 5 correspond to treatment choices with , where 
, and in case 5.
Proof of Corollary 3.2: The maximum value for and is at and 
respectively. because and 
.
Proof of Corollary 3.3: Contract payment terms for all subgames have similar format as 
in subgame 1 that is presented above. It can be shown that and . Moreover, 
because . Lastly, (where )
when .
Proof of Corollary 3.4: Corollary 3.4 is a direct result of the Proposition 3.1.
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To illustrate how testing only one patient type always results in higher value for the payer 
when compared to testing patients from both risk profiles -
to-pay for the test for three different triangular distributions.
Figure A.1: Willingness-to-pay when and 
Figure A.2: Willingness-to-pay when and 
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Figure A.3: Willingness-to-pay when and 
As the two distributions get closer to each other the difference between testing 
both patient types versus only one patient type gets smaller. We know that the 
information rent in the optimal treatment strategies decreases as the two distributions get 
closer to each other (i.e., ). In addition, the value gained from testing patients from 
both patient risk profiles in Case 6 does not outweigh the high information rent in this 
Case. Thus, Cases 2 and 4 remain the best choices of the payer even when the two 
distributions are similar.
Derivation for decentralized system with full information: The payer offers a type 
specific contract to the provider and extracts the entire provider surplus. and 
are the same as in Equations (3.3) and (3.4). The optimization problem for each patient 
type is:
s.t.
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The treatment threshold is (cf. Lemma 3.1)
problem is to satisfy the following two conditions for each of the three options:
Conditions 1A) ensures that ) results 
in
; Conditions 1B) is the 
individual-rationality constraint, 
.
Conditions 1A and 1B give the payment contracts for each option as well as the that
maximizes social welfare when . When , then, the provider should treat 
patients if and only if,
. The payer compares social welfare when with
when  . Then 
Proof of Proposition 3.2:
.
Using implicit function theorem, I have
.
I find the necessary conditions for Proposition 3.2.a. by including the optimality 
conditions of case 4 from Proposition 3.1. Similar approach can be used for Proposition 
3.
Proof of Proposition 3.3: The proof is similar to the logic presented in Proposition 3.
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Proof of Lemma 3.3 and Proposition 3.4: The program (3.12) can be solved similar to 
the system with full information where the payer offers a type specific contract to the 
provider and extracts the entire provider surplus. The pay value function is 
independent of changes in when 
; .
The ex-ante outcome of the payer when the test is compulsory is:
In order to find when it is optimal to make the test compulsory, I examine the conditions 
for such that social welfare is higher when the test is 
compulsory. Lemma 3.3 illustrates the region where compulsory testing is optimal when 
.
Proof of Corollary 3.5: The maximum value for the function is at .
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Table A.3: Optimization problem for 9 subgames
  Type-  
 Treatment 
choice 
 
(Option 0) 
 
(Option 1) 
 
(Option 2) 
Ty
pe
-
 
 
(O
pt
io
n 
0)
 
 
s.t. OTC, ICH, ICL, IRH, 
IRL 
 
s.t. OTC, ICH, ICL, 
IRH, IRL 
 
s.t. OTC, ICH, ICL, 
IRH, IRL 
 
(O
pt
io
n 
1)
 
 
s.t. OTC, ICH, ICL, IRH, 
IRL 
 
s.t. OTC, ICH, ICL, 
IRH, IRL 
 
s.t. OTC, ICH, ICL, 
IRH, IRL 
 
(O
pt
io
n 
2)
 
 
s.t. OTC, ICH, ICL, IRH, 
IRL 
 
s.t. OTC, ICH, ICL, 
IRH, IRL 
 
s.t. OTC, ICH, ICL, 
IRH, IRL 
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Appendix-C
Proof of Proposition 4.1: The on under reward strategy is
concave in efforts (i.e., ; ). Considering the non-negative savings
constraint, I have two optimal set of efforts:
1) Non-binding savings constraint: 
where solves
. Efforts are decreasing functions in target price (i.e., ; ) and 
. Given the optimal effort levels in the reward strategy, the savings constraint is 
non-binding if and only if where 
such that . To ensure I
solve
Thus,
. If 
then . Furthermore, 
such that if then .
2) Binding savings constraint: If then .
.
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The is concave in efforts (i.e., 
; ). The first-order condition (FOC) gives .
The savings are negative if and only if where 
such that . and 
when ; thus, the 
central planner would rather be in the penalty strategy instead of increasing efforts to 
Proof of Proposition 4.2:
penalty and zero savings cases (cases 2 and 3 of Proposition 4.1) is always smaller than 
the total status quo FFS profit:
Case 3) .
Thus, because 
when .
Case 2) . Thus, 
because when 
.
In case 1 where the central planner receives reward payment the central planner may be 
better off compared to the total profit in the status quo FFS model.
Case 1.iii) . Thus, 
because when .
Case 1.ii)
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.
and . Thus,
has a unique target price threshold and is satisfied if and only if (1) 
and (where 
and solves
such that ); and (2) . Therefore, if the
absolute lower bound threshold for the target price is located in Case 1.ii and otherwise in 
Case 1.i.
Case 1.i)
and .
Thus, has a unique target price threshold and is satisfied if and only if 
and such that is the unique threshold that solves .
Therefore, the absolute lower bound of the target price in centralized system is as 
follows.
Proof of Proposition 4.3: In this strategy, because the provider will only be compensated 
according to the FFS model, the provider does not exert any cost-reduction effort (i.e., 
); resulting in . The 
strategy is concave in efforts (i.e., ). Considering the non-negative savings
constraint, I have two optimal set of efforts:
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1) Non-binding savings constraint: . Given the optimal 
effort levels in the reward strategy, the savings constraint is non-binding if and only if 
where 
in target price (i.e., ); thus, to ensure I solve that gives 
. If then .
2) Binding savings constraint: If then .
.
The is concave in cost-reduction effort 
(i.e., ). The first-order condition (FOC) gives . The savings are 
negative if and only if where .
and when ; thus, the hospital would 
rather be in the penalty strategy instead of increasing efforts to bind the savings 
Proof of Proposition 4.4: avings cases (cases 2 
and 3 of Proposition 4.3) is always smaller than the total status quo FFS profit:
Case 3) . Thus, because 
when .
Case 2) . Thus, 
because when .
In case 1 where the hospital receives reward payment the hospital may be better off 
compared to the status quo FFS model.
Case 1.ii) . Thus, because 
when .
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Case 1.i)
. and 
. Thus, has a unique target price 
threshold and is satisfied if and only if . Therefore, 
the absolute lower bound of the target price in decentralized system with no gain-sharing 
agreement is where  
Proof of Proposition 4.5: The is
concave in cost-reduction effort (i.e., ). Considering the non-negative savings
constraint, I have two optimal set of efforts:
1) Non-binding savings constraint: 
profit function is concave in and (i.e., ; ). Define 
. From FOC I have and where solves
;  and solves
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such that  .
Thus, by replacing and I get . Given the optimal effort levels in the 
reward strategy, the savings constraint is non-binding if and only if where 
. The hospital must be better off when offering a gain-
sharing agreement compared to the decentralized system with no gain-sharing agreement 
(i.e., ). where 
.
2) Binding savings constraint: If then .
.
The gy is concave in effort (i.e., 
). The first-order condition (FOC) gives . In the penalty case the 
hospital will push all the penalty to the provider by setting . The savings 
are negative if and only if where such that
. When and 
when ; thus, the hospital would rather be in the penalty 
Proof of Corollary 4.1: Corollary 4.1 is a direct result of the Proposition 4.5.
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Proof of Corollary 4.2: Following proposition 4.5, the hospital sets if
. This implies that . The
in target price because .
Proof of Proposition 4.6: Under the gain sharing agreements hospital is always better off 
compared to the status quo FFS model. rofit in penalty and zero savings 
cases is always smaller than the total status quo FFS profit. In case 1 where the provider 
may be better off compared to the status quo FFS model: if where 
is unique because and . solves
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